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A Comprehensive Wealth Tax 
DAVID SHAKOW* AND REED SHULDINER** 
l. INTRODUCTION 
Income conventionally is defined as the sum of consumption and 
any change in net worth. This definition highlights three likely bases 
for a tax: income, consumption, and net worth. Tax rates can be ap-
plied to essentially any base (or combination of bases) to raise the 
revenue that government requires. 
The current U.S. federal tax system is based mainly on what is 
called an income tax. 1 While the definition of income given above is 
not used uniformly by the U.S. income tax system-for example, the 
tax system generally waits for property to be sold before it takes ac-
count of a change in value-the income tax relies to a significant de-
gree on the income of taxpayers as its base. As for alternative bases, 
in the past 30 years there has been considerable discussion of a con-
sumption tax that might replace the income tax. Little serious work 
has contemplated replacing the income tax with a wealth tax. Our 
project is to describe what a wealth tax might look like and what its 
(primarily distributional) consequences might be. 
The wealth tax that we describe consists of a fiat rate tax on most 
categories of wealth. Exemptions ensure that low wealth individuals 
would pay no tax. The wealth tax also includes a tax on earned in-
come (generally referred to as "wages"). The wage component can be 
viewed as a tax on human capital, consistent with a complete defini-
tion of wealth, or as a quasi-independent wage tax. The wage tax also 
would have only one rate. 
We find that the wealth tax leads to a distribution of taxes over 
most of the income range that is roughly the same as the current in-
come tax. Based on the data we have analyzed so far, the combined 
* Professor of Law (Emeritus), University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
** Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
The authors would like to thank participants at workshops at the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School and Georgetown Law School, at a symposium sponsored by the 
New York University Tax Law Review, especially the commentators, Michael Knoll and 
James Repetti, and a conference sponsored by the Harvard Law School Fund for Tax and 
Fiscal Research. We also would like to thank the University of Pennsylvania Research 
Foundation and the University of Pennsylvania Law School for the use of research funds. 
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ity and Medicare. 
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taxes produce a significantly greater burden than does the income tax 
on very low income individuals and produce a significantly lesser bur-
den on very high income individuals. We find the lower burden on 
higher income individuals a disturbing feature of the tax. We view the 
results so far, however, as only preliminary. We strongly suspect that 
the data we used omits substantial amounts of wealth owned by upper 
income individuals. Thus, we expect future work is likely to show in-
creased taxes would be paid by upper income individuals under a 
properly structured wealth tax. 
II. WHY C o N siDER A W E A LTH TAx? 
There are essentially two reasons for a careful consideration of a 
wealth tax. First, one might consider a wealth tax to be superior to 
both the current income tax and to widely considered alternative 
taxes, such as a consumption tax. Second, even if the wealth tax is, for 
one reason or another, an inferior tax, nevertheless, consideration of 
the wealth tax may provide useful insight on other taxes. In particu-
lar, the similarity between the wealth tax and the income tax sheds 
light on the income tax. 
For purposes of comparing the wealth tax with its alternatives, we 
adopt the standard framework for evaluating tax systems, and con-
sider effects on equity, efficiency, and administrability. We recognize 
that, theoretically, these considerations blend together within the 
framework of a social welfare function, but believe that, as a practical 
matter, the separation is useful. The following Subsections discuss the 
merits of a wealth tax under these criteria. 
A. Equity 
The classic equitable justification for the income tax is that a tax 
should be based on ability to pay and income is the best measure of 
ability to pay.2 On the face of it, however, a person's wealth appears 
to be as fair a basis for distributing a tax as her income. Both greater 
wealth and greater income clearly are correlated with greater ability 
to pay. In fact, income from capital and wealth are flip sides of the 
same concept. Income from capital is simply the increase in value of 
the stock of wealth. 
Another justification used for the income tax is that it is a form of a 
benefits tax.3 A person's income is dependent on society's infrastruc-
ture that supports economic activity. Hence, those who earn more 
2 See, e.g., David F. Bradford, Untangling the Income Tax 149-51 (1986). 
3 See id. at 150. 
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income reasonably can be asked to provide greater support for soci-
ety's infrastructure. A wealth tax can be justified along the same 
lines. A person's ability to accumulate and protect wealth is depen-
dent on society's infrastructure just as much as is his ability to earn 
income. Thus, wealth provides a reasonable basis for taxation. 
Those who find an income tax attractive from a theoretical stand-
point might prefer a wealth tax to an income tax because, in the real 
world, it is very difficult for an income tax to measure income accu-
rately. Indeed, if all capital produced the same yield , an ideal wealth 
tax would be equivalent to an ideal income tax. Since capital pro-
duces widely divergent yields, a wealth tax still can be viewed as 
equivalent to an income tax levied on the average income from capi-
tal, rather than on the actual income realized from that capital. 
A wealth tax also taxes capital that is not productively employed. 
Thus, a wealth tax can be viewed as a tax on potential income from 
capital. With respect to human capital, taxes based on potential earn-
ings are rejected in order not to tax people on what they could earn if 
they choose to earn less than they are able. Putting aside practical 
considerations, such an approach offends our sense of respect for indi-
vidual freedom. The arguments against taxing potential income from 
inanimate capital are much weaker. If two people earn $20,000 per 
year in salary, but one has $100,000 stuffed in a mattress, it does not 
seem unreasonable to say that the one with the cash in the mattress 
has a greater ability to pay a tax than the other. 
A wealth tax should be compared not only to the income tax, but 
also to a possible consumption tax. An equitable basis for a consump-
tion tax is that consumption measures the value that members of soci-
ety extract from society.4 If that is the correct basis for allocating the 
tax burden, an income tax is wrong, since income reflects what people 
contribute to society. A consumption tax also is believed by some to 
be more equitable because it does not discriminate between people 
who choose to consume early and those who choose to consume later 
in life.5 People who feel strongly about these arguments are unlikely 
to be in favor of a wealth tax because it suffers from the same weak-
nesses in this regard as does its cousin, the income tax. 
A major criticism of consumption taxes is that the most obvious 
forms of consumption taxes, such as sales taxes, seem to be inherently 
regressive since the percentage of income devoted to consumption de-
4 See William Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 
Harv. L. Rev. 1113, 1165-66 (1974); Edward J. McCaffrey, The Uneasy Case for Wealth 
Transfer Taxation, 104 Yale L.J. 283, 339 (1994). 
5 See Bradford, note 2, at 162-66. 
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creases as mcome and wealth increase.6 R ealistic consumption tax 
structures have been developed, however, that impose a progressive 
tax rate structure on a person's annual consumption .7 Thus, some 
have argued that consumption taxes are not inherently more regres-
sive than income taxes.8 Nevertheless, many of the consumption tax 
proposals that seem to be politically most acceptable are significantly 
less progressive than the income tax.9 The potential strength of the 
wealth tax over the consumption tax is that it may be able to achieve 
progressivity with a flat rate structure. 
Progressivity in the income tax primarily comes from two sources. 
First, progressivity is achieved by exempting income under a certain 
level. The current income tax exempts a basic level of income through 
the combination of the standard deduction and the personal exemp-
tion.10 Second, the income tax has progressive rates, beyond the im-
plicit zero bracket inherent in an exemption amount.l 1 
Progressivity is defined generally as an increase in the average tax 
burden with increased income. 12 Once one moves away from the in-
come tax, an obvious question is whether progressivity should be de-
fined according to some other base, such as wealth or consumption. 
6 The sentence in the text appears to be internally inconsistent, since it starts with the 
assumption that consumption is the correct tax base yet it tests regressivity against a base 
of income or wealth. In fact, most discussions of the progressivity of a consumption tax 
assume that something other than consumption (generally, income) should be the base 
against which the progressivity of the tax is measured. Bradford, note 2, at 162 (discussing 
equity of a consumption tax in terms of income). 
7 See, e.g., Bradford, note 2, at 319 (discussing consumption-oriented modification of 
the income tax base). 
s Id. at 3 ("Consumption taxes are often thought to be regressive; in fact, they can be as 
progressive as one wants"). An alternative line of argument is that the proper comparison 
is not made on an annual basis , but over a lifetime, and that when so viewed, a fiat rate 
consumption tax is lifetime proportional, not regressive. See, e.g., James M. Poterba, Life-
time Incidence and the Distributional Burden of Excise Taxes, 79 Am. Econ . Rev. 325 
(1989). We intend to explore the lifetime issue more fully as we develop this project. 
9 E.g., William G. Gale, Building a Better Tax System: Can a Consumption Tax Deliver 
the Goods?, 95 TNT 218-95 (Nov. 7, 1995), available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File. 
("Although the fiat tax is more progressive than a VAT, it is more regressive than the 
current system"). 
10 IRC §§ 63, 151. 
It IRC § 1. Progressivity also is achieved through the earned income credit. IRC § 132. 
We treat the earned income credit, however, as independent from the income tax. In the-
ory, there is no reason why a wealth tax could not be combined with a similar earned 
income tax credit. Additionally, progressivity currently is achieved through a variety of 
provisions that provide benefits for lower income individuals that are phased out for higher 
income individuals. See, e.g., IRC § 21 (dependent care credit), § 24 (child tax credit), 
§ 25A (Hope and lifetime Learning credits) , § 151(d) (phaseout of personal exemption), 
§ 219 (individual retirement account), § 221 (deduction for interest on educational loan), 
§ 408A (Roth IRA). 
12 It is also possible to define progressivity in terms of marginal rates , but it seems more 
useful to us to define it in terms of average rates. 
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For now, however, we continue to use income as the base against 
which progressivity is measured. 'vVe are not entirely comfortabie with 
using income as the base for defining progressivity. In particular, if 
one accepts that wealth is the correct base on which to impose a tax, 
there seems to be little reason that a wealth tax should be judged 
against income. 
Accepting both the definition and desirability of progressivity, we 
believe a reasonably structured wealth tax can achieve progressivity 
by income class that is comparable to that of the income tax. We say 
"reasonably structured" because we are certain that an appropriate 
combination of rates and exemptions can make a wealth tax as pro-
gressive as an income tax. Comparable arguments are made for a con-
sumption tax. What we view as potentially special about a wealth tax 
is that we believe it can be structured as a flat rate tax, and still have 
the benefits of progressivity beyond what the credits provide. 
The intuition behind our belief that suitable progressivity can be 
achieved with a single (nonzero) rate is that substantial income from 
wealth effectively goes untaxed under the current income tax system. 
We think it quite reasonable to believe that much of that low-taxed 
wealth is held by the wealthiest (or, if you will, the highest income) 
individuals. Hence, one of the primary questions is whether, by bring-
ing these assets into the system, we have made our base sufficiently 
progressive, at least as compared to the current income tax, that a fiat 
rate tax on wealth (coupled with appropriate exemptions and a fiat 
rate tax on wages) can yield progressivity comparable to the current 
income tax. Our expectation has been that, if such progressivity can 
be achieved, the wealth tax may be preferable to the current income 
tax from a fairness perspective because it is likely to apply more uni-
formly within wealth (and income) classes. 
Another way to express this intuition is to say that, as adjusted gross 
income (AGI)-the primary measure of income in the current income 
tax-increases, wealth increases disproportionately. Some idea of the 
relationship between net worth, earned income, and AGI can be ob-
tained from Figures 1 through 3_13 Figures 1 and 2 show net worth and 
earned income as a percentage of AGI by AGI category.14 Figure 2 is 
the same as Figure 1 except that it only includes data on individuals 
with AGI greater than $15,000. 
13 The data in these figures comes from the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF). 
See Section V for a description of the SCF. See Section VILA. for a discussion of net 
worth . See Subsection VII.B. for a discussion of the definition of earned income. Figures 
13 and 14 in the Appendix show aggregate figures for net worth and earned income by 
AGI category. 
14 The percentages shown in Figures 1 through 3 are computed as weighed averages of 
the percentage for each individual within an AGI class. 
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As can be seen from the figures, earned income slowly but steadily 
declines as a fraction of AGI. After a precipitous fall in the $1,000 to 
$15 ,000 range of AGI , net worth steadily increases as a percentage of 
AGI. The increase becomes quite steep between the $100,000 to 
$200,000 category and the $200,000 to $500,000 category and then 
drops somewhat for those with AGI over $500,000. Also shown in 
Figures 1 and 2 is taxable net worth as a percentage of AGI. Taxable 
net worth is defined as net worth minus housing equity up to $1 mil-
lion. As the graphs show, housing becomes less important as net 
worth increases. 
Figure 3 adds an additional line, net worth as a percentage of 
earned income. Since earned income is very close to AG I, the line 
closely tracks the line for net worth as a percentage of AGI. Net 
worth as a percentage of earned income significantly diverges from 
net worth as a percentage of AGI only for individuals with AGI over 
$1 million. 
Since the wealth tax described here consists of two flat rate compo-
nents, a tax on wages and a tax on capital, it follows from Figures 1 
through 3 that the tax on wages, standing alone, would be a regressive 
tax when measured against AGI while the tax on capital would be 
progressive. Since we can vary the relative contributions of each com-
ponent of the tax (by varying their rates), we are able to achieve any 
measure of progressivity between that arising solely from a wage tax 
and that arising solely from a tax on capitaP5 In either case, further 
progressivity can be achieved by providing for a credit or exemption.16 
B. Efficiency 
Efficiency refers to the effects of a tax system on the smooth func-
tioning of a market economy. Any realistic tax system interferes with 
a pure market economy by altering prices and hence altering decisions 
that participants in the market would have made absent a tax sys-
tem.l7 Economists evaluate the effects of a tax system to see how seri-
ously the tax system interferes with economic decisionmaking. They 
also try to determine whether the tax system encourages decisions 
that are good for the economy. 
To explore the efficiency of a wealth tax, we first consider some of 
the characteristics of a wealth tax. We then compare the wealth tax to 
its primary alternatives, an income tax and a consumption tax. 
15 Additional progressivity could be achieved by applying negative tax rates to wages. 
16 See Section V for a discussion of credits and exemptions. 
17 Taxes that do not vary with behavior, such as head taxes, usually are seen as efficient. 
Generally, however, they are not viewed as fair or practical. 
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We argue below that a wealth tax differs from other taxes on capital 
primarily in its lump sum nature. Before characterizing the wealth 
tax, however, it is helpful to look at the difference between an ex ante 
wealth tax and an ex post wealth tax. 
1. Ex Ante vs. Ex Post Wealth Taxes 
An ex ante wealth tax is a tax on wealth measured at the beginning 
of each period while an ex post wealth tax is imposed on wealth mea-
sured at the end of each period.18 Generally, the difference between 
the two taxes is unimportant for two reasons. 19 For one thing, under 
certain conditions described below, the two taxes generate identical 
outcomes. More importantly, if the taxes are imposed on a periodic 
basis, they can be made entirely equivalent. 
a. One-Period Wealth Tax 
Consider first the one-period wealth tax. Assume an individual has 
a fixed pool of savings, S, that she plans to invest. She expects a re-
turn of z on her savings, where z may be a safe rate of return or may 
be a random variable representing a risky return. The amount of her 
investment does not affect the rate of return. If subject to an ex ante 
wealth tax at a rate Tw, she would be able to invest, after tax: 
S X (1 - T w) (1) 
At the end of the investment period, she would have available to 
consume: 
S X (1 - Tw) X (1 + z) (2) 
By contrast, with an ex post wealth tax, she would be able to invest 
the entire S. At the end of the investment period, prior to tax, she 
would have: 
S x (1 + z) (3) 
After tax, she would be able to consume: 
S X (1 + z) X (1 - Tw) ( 4) 
Expressions 2 and 4 are always equal. Subject to the qualifications 
discussed below, the ex ante and ex post wealth taxes produce identi-
cal outcomes from the viewpoint of the taxpayer.20 
18 Although it need not be the case, we assume the tax is payable when the wealth is 
measured. 
19 The discussion in the text assumes that the tax is proportional and that the tax rate 
does not change over time. 
zo From the viewpoint of the government, the two taxes are not necessarily identical 
because in the case of the ex ante tax, the government can choose to invest the revenues in 
any manner available to it, while in the case of the ex post tax, the government's tax reve-
nues depend on the outcome of the investment. Essentially, the ex post tax makes the 
government a partner in the taxpayer's investment. In theory, the government could make 
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While the ex ante and ex post wealth taxes produce identical out-
comes, they obviously do not produce identical tax payments. Since 
the tax payments are different, particularly where the return is risky, it 
may seem unintuitive that the ex ante and ex post wealth taxes pro-
duce identical outcomes. In particular, in the ex ante case, the tax 
paid is certain , while in the ex post case, the tax paid is uncertain, 
depending on the outcome of the risky return. The question, how-
ever, is not whether the tax paid is the same, but whether the ultimate 
after-tax outcome is the same. The reason the outcome is the same is 
quite simple. The ex post tax captures a fixed percentage of both ini-
tial wealth and the return from the investment. The ex ante tax di-
rectly captures the same fixed percentage of initial wealth. In 
addition, since the ex ante tax has to be paid up front , it reduces the 
size of the investment, thus reducing the same fixed percentage of the 
return as with the ex post tax. 
As mentioned above, the conclusion that the taxes are identical 
must be qualified in at least two ways. First, the ex ante and ex post 
taxes are not the same if there are net additions or subtractions to 
savings during the period from sources other than investment earn-
ings. In particular, net additions to savings during the taxable period, 
such as from saved wages, escape the ex ante tax, while net subtrac-
tions from savings, such as due to consumption out of savings, escape 
the ex post tax. 
Second, the two taxes do not treat inframarginal returns identi-
cally.21 In particular, the excess of the inframarginal returns over the 
marginal returns (the "excess inframarginal returns") is treated just 
like additions to savings out of wages. Excess inframarginal returns 
escape an ex ante wealth tax, but are taxed as part of wealth by an ex 
post wealth tax. The following example shows the difference in treat-
ment between ex ante and ex post wealth taxes. 
Example 1: T, who has $1,000 in savings, has a unique op-
portunity to invest in a project. The project is expected to 
have a 100% return. The most that T can invest in the pro-
ject is $1,000, although he could invest less. If he invests the 
full $1,000, he will have $2,000 at the end of the period. T 
also can borrow and lend at the market rate of 10%. If there 
is an ex post 10% wealth tax, Twill pay $200 at the end of 
the ex post tax equivalent to the ex ante tax by selling the taxpayer's investment short and 
investing the proceeds in its preferred investment. Alternatively, the government could 
make the ex ante tax equivalent to the ex post tax by investing the tax proceeds in the same 
investment as the taxpayer. 
21 As discussed more fully below, inframarginal returns are above-market returns avail-
able in limited amounts to particular investors on particular projects. 
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the period, and be left with $1,800. If there is an ex ante tax , 
T will pay $100 up front , leaving only $900 for the invest-
ment. T , however, can borrow $100 to pay the tax, and , 
therefore, invest a full $1,000 in the project. A t the end of 
the period, Twill have wealth of $2,000 from the project, but 
will owe $110 on the loan used to pay the ex ante tax. After 
paying off the loan, Twill be left with $1,890. Thus, T will be 
better off under the ex ante , rather than the ex post tax. 
While it is clear from the example that the ex ante and ex post 
wealth tax impose different burdens on inframarginal returns, it is 
worth exploring the nature of the difference. It is straightforward to 
show that the ex ante wealth tax is equivalent to an ex post wealth tax 
that exempts the excess inframarginal return.22 The following exam-
ple illustrates the point. 
Example 2: Ts $2,000 ex post wealth in Example 1 can be 
divided into three components: the original investment 
($1,000) , the marginal return ($100), and the excess in-
framarginal return ($900). A 10% wealth tax that exempted 
the inframarginal return would collect $110. T would be left 
with $1 ,890, exactly the same amount as under the ex ante 
wealth tax. 
With either tax, if the tax is imposed in future periods, the excess 
inframarginal return becomes part of the subsequent tax base to the 
extent that it is not consumed. In summary, in the case of a one-pe-
riod tax, the ex ante and ex post taxes are very similar, but not 
identical. 
22 The relationship be tween the ex ante and ex post tax can be shown algebraicall y. 
Assume an individual has an opportunity to invest an amountS at an inframarginal return 
g. The individual can borrow and lend at the marginal rate r. For convenience, assume 
that the individual has initial wealth equal to S. If the re is an ex ante wealth tax at a rate 
T,., the ex ante tax liability is: 
Tno= S X Tw. (1) 
where the subscript 0 indicates the time of the payment and the supe rscript a indicates the 
ex ante tax. If the individual borrows to pay the tax, the tax liability at Time 1 is: 
PI = (1 + r) X S X Tw· (2) 
If there is an ex post wealth tax at the same rate, then after investing S at rate g, T owes: 
P , = S X (1 + g) X T.,.. (3) 
The superscript p indicates the ex post tax. Rewriting the equation , one obtains: 
pi = (1 + r) X S X T w + (g - r) X S X T w. (4) 
Substituting: 
PI = r , + (g - r) X s X Tw· (5) 
The final term is the excess inframarginal re turn multiplied by the tax rate . Thus, the ex 
post tax, P 1, is equal to the ex ante tax adjusted for the earlier payment. PI , plus a tax on 
the excess inframarginal return . 
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b. Periodic Wealth Tax 
The more important case is where the wealth tax is imposed over 
multiple periods. With a periodic wealth tax, the differences between 
an ex ante and ex post tax essentially evaporate. Since the beginning 
of each period is also the end of the prior period, the differences be-
tween the two wealth taxes arise only for the first and last periods. In 
particular, an ex ante weal th tax captures inherited wealth, while an ex 
post wealth tax captures assets remaining at death (that is, amounts 
bequeathed or wealth at the termination of the tax). Since an ex ante 
wealth tax could treat death as the beginning of the final taxable pe-
riod and an ex post wealth tax could treat birth as the end of the first 
taxable period, the two taxes could be made identical. Given the simi-
larity between ex ante and ex post wealth taxes, we do not always 
distinguish between the two. 
In any case, a periodic wealth tax exempts wealth that is both 
earned and consumed during the taxable period. It is worth noting 
that the shorter the taxable period, the less wealth can escape the tax 
through consumption. In this Article, we assume an annual weaith 
tax, although a shorter period could be used.23 
2. Wealth Taxes as Lump Sum Taxes 
The key to understanding the economic effect of a wealth tax is to 
understand its nature as a quasi lump sum tax. As discussed below, 
the tax is lump sum in the sense that given the decision to save, the tax 
does not depend on the return from the investment.24 The tax is not 
lump sum in the sense that the amount of the tax depends on the 
amount that the individual chooses to save rather than consume. 
To see the quasi lump sum nature of the tax, consider a simple 
model with an ex ante wealth tax (remembering the general equiva-
lence between ex ante and ex post wealth taxes). Assume that T earns 
y at time zero. T must make a decision to consume some or all of his 
earnings and to save any amount not consumed. Consumption is im-
mediate and there is an ex ante wealth tax at a rate Tw on any amount 
not consumed. It is clear that the wealth tax increases the price of 
future consumption relative to current consumption and has the effect 
23 In theory, one could adopt a continuous wealth tax. See Jeff Strnad, Periodicity and 
Accretion Taxation: Norms and Implementation, 99 Yale L.J. 1817 (1990) (discussing the 
optimal taxable period under the income tax). There is no necessary connection between 
the frequency of valuation and the frequency of collection or filing. For example, one 
could have a tax based on average end-of-month valuations, with annual filing, and quar-
terly payment of estimated tax. 
24 The statement in the text ignores investments in human capital, which may or may not 
be taxed at the same rate depending on the human capital portion of the tax. 
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of discouraging savings. In this regard, the wealth tax acts like an in-
come tax. 25 
On the other hand, consider the decision as to how to invest. The 
individual must pay a fixed charge, T w x W, irrespective of how the 
individual chooses to invest his wealth. In this sense, it is a lump sum 
tax and lump sum taxes are efficient in that they do not distort prices 
and, therefore, economic decisions.26 
The quasi lump sum nature of the wealth tax is explored more fully 
in the following comparison between the wealth tax and income and 
consumption taxes. 
3. Comparison of Wealth Taxes With Income and Consumption 
Taxes 
In order to compare the effect of wealth taxes on capital, it is useful 
to divide income from capital into several categories: the real risk-
free return, the return to risk, and inframarginal returns.27 In addi-
tion, although not strictly a return to capital, the taxation of inflation-
ary returns needs to be examined. Except where specifically noted, 
the following discussion assumes that the tax in question is propor-
tional, that is, the effects of progressivity are ignored. 
a. Real Risk-Free Return 
Consider first a world where all capital yields the same certain real 
rate of return r. In such a world, an income tax would burden income 
from capital at the statutory rate. A consumption tax, on the other 
25 A wealth tax reduces the return to savings and hence increases the price of future 
consumption relative to current consumption. Therefore, people would tend to substitute 
away from future consumption towards current consumption (the substitution effect). On 
the other hand, a wealth tax also increases the amount of savings required to fund any 
given level of future consumption (the income effect). Thus, a wealth tax, like an income 
tax, may increase the level of savings. See generally Anthony B. Atkinson & Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, Lecture 3: Taxation, Savings and Decisions Over Time, in Lectures on Public Eco-
nomics 62 (1980). 
26 To be more precise, there will be no substitution effect, although there may be a 
wealth effect. The wealth effect, however, does not carry with it an excess burden or dead-
weight loss. Given, however, the presence of other distortions in the economy, including 
the wealth tax itself, it cannot be said that it is necessarily more efficient not to distort the 
investment decision. 
27 Although it is standard in the literature to speak of the real risk-free return, generally 
it is not possible to invest at a real risk-free rate. For example, a one-year U.S Treasury bill 
may have near zero default risk, but it has inflation risk. Moreover, the riskiness of the 
Treasury bill depends on the desired timing of consumption and on the other assets held by 
the individual. For example, if the individual desires to use the proceeds of the investment 
in less than or more than one year, the Treasury bill also has interest rate risk. See Atkin-
son & Stiglitz, note 19, at 102-04. 
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hand, would impose no burden on capitaJ.28 The consumption tax 
does not burden savings because when a taxpayer chooses to defer 
consumption, he also is permitted to defer tax on the deferred con-
sumption. The value of the tax deferral is exactly equal to the extra 
tax imposed on the deferred consumption.29 
A wealth tax, like the income tax, imposes a tax on capital. As ar-
gued above, the wealth tax is best viewed as a lump sum tax on capi-
tal. If the rate of return r is constant, the wealth tax T w operates 
exactly like an income tax T w according to the following relationship: 
t ; 
(1 + r) 
X f;. 30 
(1 + r) 
r 
r 
28 Generally, under a consumption tax , a tax is imposed on consumption out of invest-
ment earnings , but, as explained below, there is no burden from the tax. Depending on 
implementation, a consumption tax may burden pre-existing capital. The fact that a con-
sumption tax does not burden capital is we ll-known in the literature. See, e.g., Bradford, 
note 2, at 162-66; William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal In-
come Tax, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1113 (1974); Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the De-
bate Between an Income Tax and a Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk? Does it 
Matter?, 47 Tax L. Rev. 377 (1992); Michael Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Con-
sumption Tax, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1575 (1979); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., How Much Capital 
Income Taxed Under an Income Tax Is Exempt Under a Cash Flow Tax?, 52 Tax L. Rev. 1 
(1996) [hereinafter Capital Income]; Alvin C. Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be 
Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 80 Yale L.J. 1081 (1980). 
29 The fact that a consumption tax does not burden capital can be shown algebraically. 
Consider, a person who has S dollars that he can consume currently (time 0) or invest for 
one period (time 1). Assume that there is a consumption tax at the tax-inclusive rate Tc. 
For a discussion of the difference between a tax-inclusive and tax-exclusive rate, see note 
31. If spent now, the person has the following consumption C and tax liability T: 
Co = S X (1 - Tc) 
To= S X Tc. 
If saved for one year, the amount available for spending increases by a factor of (1 + r), for 
total savings of (1 + r) x S. The individual then has consumption and tax liability of: 
C1 = (1 + r) X S X (1 - Tc) 
T1 = (1 + r) X S X Tc. 
By substitution: 
C1 = C0 x (1 + r) 
T1 = T0 x (1 + r). 
Thus, the amount available for consumption at Time 1 is exactly the quantity (1 + r) multi-
plied by the amount available at time 0. In other words, deferred consumption increases at 
the rate of return , with no diminution for taxes. Thus, there is in effect no burden on 
savings. 
Put another way, the amount of the tax liability increases only by the rate of return , and 
therefore the tax savings from deferring consumption exactly pays for the tax on the incre-
mental consumption from savings. 
30 The factor of r adjusts for the fact that the wealth tax is on the entire wealth , while the 
income tax is only on the yield . The factor of (1 + r) adjusts for the fact that the ex ante 
wealth tax is paid one period earlier than the income tax. 
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Where the rate of return is not constant, the two taxes diverge. In 
particular, as the risk-free rate rises (falls), the wealth tax becomes a 
decreasing (increasing) proportion of the income from the asset. One 
implication of the lump sum nature of the wealth tax is that individu-
als will become more sensitive to changes in the interest rate, because 
the tax will not blunt the effect of the change. These results are easy 
to see with a series of examples. 
Example 3: Assume that T earns $100 that he either must 
spend this year or save and spend next year on consumption. 
Any amounts saved earn interest at 10%. 
Income Tax: Under a 40% income tax, T pays $40 in taxes 
and can consume $60 currently or save the $60. If he saves 
the $60, he earns $6 and pays an additional tax of $2.40 on 
the interest. His consumption then is $63.60, 6% more than 
he could have consumed in the first period. His return on 
savings is reduced from a 10% pretax rate to a 6% after-tax 
rate (a 40% reduction corresponding to the 40% mcome 
tax). 
Consumption Tax: Under a 40% (tax-inclusive) consump-
tion tax, T can consume $60 currently and pay tax of $40.31 
Alternatively, T can save the $100, leaving him with $110 af-
ter earning a year's interest. He then can consume $66, pay-
ing a tax of $44. By saving, T increases his after-tax 
consumption by the full 10% rate of return. Therefore, the 
consumption tax does not burden savings. 
Wealth Tax (With Wage Tax): Assume a 3.64% wealth tax 
combined with a 40% wage tax.32 T has $60 to spend cur-
rently on consumption or to save for the following period. If 
he spends the $60 currently, there is no wealth tax burden. If 
he saves it, he pays a wealth tax of $2.18, leaving $57.82 after 
taxes. After earning interest of $5.78, T has savings of 
31 A tax can be stated on either a tax-inclusive or tax-exclusive basis. Income taxes 
generally are stated on a tax-inclusive basis (that is, the tax base includes the funds used to 
pay the tax). Sales taxes generally are stated on a tax-exclusive basis (the tax base excludes 
the funds used to pay the tax). For convenience, the consumption tax in the example is 
stated on a tax-inclusive basis. The equivalent tax-exclusive rate would be 67%. The tax-
exclusive rate Tex can be stated in terms of the tax-inclusive rate T;,c according to the follow-
ing formula: 
We state the wealth tax on a tax-inclusive basis. 
32 3.64% = .10/(1 + .10) X .40. 
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$63.60, only 6% more than he could have consumed in the 
first period. His return from savings has been reduced 40 % 
by the wealth tax, just as with the 40% income tax. 
Wealth Tax With Higher Interest Rate: Assume the same facts 
as above, except that the pretax yield increases to 20%. If T 
saves $60, he owes the same $2.18 in taxes. His $57.82 in 
savings earns interest of $11.56, leaving him with $69.38 after 
tax , 16% more than he could have consumed in the first pe-
riod. Both the pretax return and the after-tax return rise by 
the same 10 percentage points. 
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The conclusion that a consumption tax does not impose a burden on 
savings depends on the assumption that the tax is not progressive. If 
the tax is progressive, the tax generally can be decreased by smooth-
ing consumption over the taxpayer's lifetime. Correspondingly, the 
tax would tend to increase as consumption was lumped into fewer 
periods.33 
The discussion above assumes idealized versions of the taxes. An 
actual tax will not behave as described for several reasons. For exam-
ple, actual income taxes depend heavily on the realization doctrine 
and usually have preferential rates for capital gains. Thus, the effec-
tive rate on savings may be far lower than the statutory rate. More-
over, the effective rate of tax generally differs depending on the form 
of the investment, the holding period, and other factors. Consump-
tion and wealth taxes are generally not dependent on the realization 
doctrine. Actual tax systems are also likely to exempt certain forms of 
capital or expenditure. A wealth tax will have varying difficulty in 
valuing various types of investments, which is likely to lead to differ-
ent effective rates on different investments. 
The first row of Table 1 summarizes the results for the real risk-free 
return. 
33 A progressive consumption tax can have the characteristic that it does not burden 
investment if the tax provides an appropriate averaging mechanism. Further conditions 
are required for this conclusion. One is that tax rates remain constant over time. See, e.g. , 
Michael J. Graetz & Deborah H. Schenk, Federal Income Taxation: Principles and Policies 
306-08 (3d ed. , 1995) (discussing conditions under which expensing is equivalent to exemp-
tion of income from capital) . Moreover, the conclusion that a consumption tax does not 
burden capital does not apply to inframarginal returns, as discussed below. 
Type of return to capital 
Normal real risk-free 
return (r) 
Risk premium 
Excess infra-
marginal returns 
Inflationary return 
Evenness of taxation of 
different forms of capital 
TABLE l 
COMPARISON OF VARIOUS TAXES ON CAPITAL 
Ideal indexed income tax 
Taxed at statutory rate 
Taxed, but can offset tax by 
increasing pretax risk 
Taxed (by assumption, can-
not gross up) 
Not taxed (indexed basis) 
Even 
Unindexed income tax 
without loss offset 
Taxed at statutory rate sub-
ject to equalization , capital 
gains, etc. 
Consumption tax 
No tax (tax offset by the 
value of expensing) 
Potentially heavily taxed due No tax burden 
to Jack of loss offsets 
Taxed (often lightly due to 
deferral and capital gains) 
Taxed at statutory rate 
(unindexed basis) 
Uneven; problems with 
depreciation, inflation, reali-
zation, capital gains 
Taxed (cannot invest tax 
savings at infra-
marginal rate) 
No tax (basis equals zero) 
Generally more even; not 
worried about depreciation , 
realization, etc. 
Wealth tax 
Lump sum tax; can be 
viewed as equiva lent to 
income tax at a rate of T w x 
(1 + r)!r 
Not taxed 
Not taxed 
Not taxed 
Generally even, but can be 
serious valuation problems 
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b. Return to Risk Bearing 
t. An Income Tax 
Matters become more complicated when returns to risk are consid-
ered. Consider first an income tax with full loss offsets. Assuming no 
response to the tax, an income tax burdens risk premia and reduces 
the variance of risky outcomes.34 Since the tax reduces risk, however, 
a rational taxpayer can respond to the income tax by shifting invest-
ments from safe to risky assets without increasing the risk of his port-
folio beyond that originally desired. Such a shift can fully offset the 
tax on the risk premium. Thus, if taxpayers respond optimally to the 
income tax, the effect of an income tax is to tax only the risk-free rate 
and neither to tax the risk premium nor reduce the after-tax riskiness 
of the portfolio.35 
Example 4: Assume that in addition to a safe investment 
yielding 10%, there is a risky investment that has an ex-
pected yield of 20%. In particular, an investment of $100 has 
an equal likelihood of yielding either $50 or $190.36 
Pretax Position: Assume further that prior to the imposition 
of the tax, T chose to save $100 and invest one-half of his 
portfolio in the safe asset and one-half in the risky asset.37 
Thus, if Tis lucky, T has income of $50 and total assets of 
$150.38 If T is unlucky, T has a loss of $20 and his assets 
decrease to $80.39 Ts expected return is $15 for an expected 
rate of return of 15%.40 
34 The classic discussion of risk bearing under an income tax is Evsey D. Domar & Rich-
ard A. Musgrave, Proportional Income Taxation and Risk-taking, 38 Q.J. Econ. 388 (1944). 
For a modern treatment, see Atkinson & Stiglitz, note 25, at 97-127. 
35 For explications of this point, see Noel B. Cunningham, 52 Tax L. Rev. 17, 29-40 
(1996); Warren, Capital Income, note 28, at 4-13. The pretax level of risk can be main-
tained by increasing the proportion of risky assets by a factor of 11(1 - T), where Tis the tax 
rate . Although the effect of the income tax on the risk premium and on the net level of 
risk can be fully offset by increasing the proportion of risky assets, the taxpayer may 
choose to accept a lower or higher level of risk. In particular, the income tax has a wealth 
effect that may lead to a greater or lesser desired level of after-tax risk. An income tax 
decreases (increases) the level of risk taken by the individual depending on whether the 
wealth elasticity of demand for the risky asset is positive (negative). See Atkinson & Stig-
litz, note 25, at 106. 
36 The return is either a negative 50% or a positive 90%. The expected payoff is $120 
for a 20% return. 
37 In theory, the amount that T chooses to invest in the risky asset depends on the rela-
tive returns of the safe and risky assets and Ts tolerance for risk. 
38 $150 = (.5)($100)(1 + .10) + (.5)($100)(1 + .90). 
39 $80 = (.5)($100)(1 + .10) + (.5)($100)(1 - .50). 
40 $15 = (.5)($50) + (.5)(-$20). 
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Income TtiX Without Portfolio Adjustment: Assume a 40 cYo 
income tax. If Tis lucky, he has pretax income of $50, pays a 
tax of $20, and has after-tax income of $30. If Tis unlucky, 
he has a pretax loss of $20, receives a tax refund (or a reduc-
tion of tax against other earnings) of $8 and has an after-tax 
loss of $12. T's expected after-tax return is $9 for an ex-
pected rate of return of 9%. T's pretax expected rate of re-
turn is reduced 40% (from 15% to 9%) by the 40% income 
tax. 
Income Tax With Portfolio Adjustment: Assume T adjusts his 
portfolio in response to the income tax, increasing his risky 
investment to $83.33 and decreasing his safe investment to 
$16.67. If Tis lucky, he has pretax income of $76.67, pays a 
tax of $30.67, and has after-tax income of $46. If T is un-
lucky, he has a pretax loss of $40, receives a tax refund of 
$16, and has an after-tax loss of $24. T's expected after-tax 
return is $11, for an expected rate of return of 11%. Relative 
to his pretax position, T's expected return is reduced by 4 
percentage points, which is equal to the tax rate of 40% mul-
tiplied by the 10% safe return. 
The result in Example 4 depends on certain key assumptions. First, 
the income tax must be proportional. Second, the tax must permit 
losses to be fully offset against other income and provide for refunds if 
taxable income is less than zero.41 By contrast, the current income tax 
is progressive and imposes severe restrictions on losses.42 Thus, the 
current income tax can impose a severe penalty on risky investments. 
In addition, the necessary portfolio adjustment to offset the risk ef-
fects of the income tax may require borrowing or increasing the level 
of borrowing. Thus, the argument depends on taxpayers being able to 
borrow freely at the ·risk-free rate.43 
41 The requirement of full loss offsets can be thought of as an extension of the propor-
tionality requirement to the negative income range. 
42 Losses are limited by both taxable income and the capital loss limitation. IRC §§ 1, 
1211. In both cases, the loss may be eligible to be carried over to other years (with deferral 
if carried forward). IRC §§ 170, 1211. Even if allowed, losses may be less valuable due to 
the progressive tax structure, which tends to overtax gains relative to losses, particularly in 
the absence of income averaging. IRC § 1 (progressive rate structure). Compare IRC 
§§ 1301-1305 (repealed) (income averaging for all taxpayers) , with IRC § 1301 (income 
averaging for farmers). The realization requirement and reduced rates for capital gains 
mutes the effect of the income tax on risk. IRC § 1(h). In addition to IRC § 1211 , there 
are many other provisions that restrict losses. See, e.g., IRC § 469 (passive loss 
limitations). 
43 Cunningham, note 35, at 37-39. 
2000] A COMPREHENSIVE WEALTH TAX 519 
n. /1 Consumption Tax 
A. consumption tax generally imposes no burden on either a risk-
free return or a risky return. The analysis parallels the analysis for the 
risk-free return: \-Vhether the return is risk-free or risky, the tax saved 
by deferring consumption exactly pays for the tax later due on the 
deferred consumption so long as the deferred tax is invested with the 
same return as the deferred consumption.44 
Example 5: As in Example 4, there is a risky investment with 
an equal likelihood of returning either negative 50% or posi-
tive 90%. The expected return on the investment is 20%. 
Assume a 40% tax-inclusive consumption tax. T has $100 
that he can either spend currently or save and spend in the 
next period. If T chooses to consume this period, T could 
consume $60, paying a tax of $40. 
If T chooses to save and invests in the risky asset, he has 
either $50 or $190 available for consumption (and payment 
of taxes). If he is lucky, he could consume $114 (paying tax 
of $76). If he is unlucky, he could consume $30 (paying tax 
of $20). His expected consumption, therefore, is $72.4 5 
Thus, his expected return is 20%, unreduced by the tax. 
As in the case of the income tax, the no-burden result relies on 
proportional rates. Unlike the income tax, the assumption of loss off-
sets is unnecessary because consumption is always positive.46 
m. A Wealth Tax 
A wealth tax imposes no burden on risky investments beyond that 
imposed on safe investments. Thus, while a wealth tax discourages 
savings, it does not distort the decision as between safe and risky in-
vestments. The argument is simple and follows directly from the lump 
sum nature of the tax. Consider a taxpayer who has a pool of wealth 
W. She can invest the wealth in either a safe or risky asset. In either 
44 The algebraic proof is essentially the same as in the risk-free case. See note 29. Tis 
considering spending one dollar on consumption currently or in one year. There is a con-
sumption tax at the rate Tc. If spent now, T pays a tax of Tc and consumes (1 - Tc)· If saved 
for one year, the amount available for spending increases to (1 + z), where z is a random 
variable representing the risky return. If the savings then are spent in full, the is be (1 + 
z)Tc and the amount left for consumption is (1 + z)(1 - Tc)· The amount available for 
consumption, after tax, increases by exactly the ex post rate of return. Thus, there is no tax 
burden on savings. 
45 $72 ::: (.5)($114) + (.5)($30). 
46 While consumption is always positive, it may be less than an exemption amount, 
which may have the effect of discouraging risktaking. 
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case, however, she will have an identical tax liability, T ,.. x \IV. Thus, 
the tax is a fixed cost and does not distort her decision:n :Moreover, 
since the amount of the wealth tax is independent of the outcome of a 
risky investment, there is no reduction in risk and no incentive or op-
portunity to shift into the risky asse t without increasing the overall 
level of risk. Since an ex post wealth tax is equivalent to an ex ante 
wealth tax, an ex post wealth tax also imposes no burden on risky 
investments beyond that imposed on safe investments. 
The effect of the various taxes on risky investments is summarized 
in the second row of Table 1.48 
c. Inframarginal Returns 
The analysis above assumed that the investor could freely adjust the 
amount of his investment in different assets without changing the rate 
of return on the assets; in other words, that all investments were mar-
ginal investments. The assumption of marginal investments is quite 
reasonable for most investors most of the time. For example , if an 
individual is considering an investment in a bank deposit, a mutual 
fund, a publicly traded stock, or publicly traded bonds, the individual 
generally can invest as much as she likes without having a measurable 
effect on the rate of return on the investment. On the other hand, 
there are other investment opportunities where it is reasonable to as-
sume that an above-market return is available on a limited basis. For 
example, an individual may be aware of a unique business opportunity 
requiring a relatively fixed amount of capital.49 Individuals are as-
sumed to fully invest in an inframarginal investment until, on the mar-
gin, it has become a marginal investment. How common 
inframarginal returns are is an empirical question.50 
The analysis of income and consumption taxes changes once in-
framarginal returns are taken into account. The analysis of the wealth 
tax, however, remains unchanged. As explained below, both income 
47 More precisely, there is no substitution effect, although there may be a wealth effect. 
48 See page 516. 
49 We suspect that many such unique opportunities are better viewed as returns to labor 
than returns to capital. For example, William Gentry and Glenn Hubbard suggest that 
inframarginal returns are associated with "rents to ideas, managerial skill, or market 
power. " William M. Gentry & R. Glenn Hubbard, Distributional Implications of Introduc-
ing a Broad-Based Consumption Tax, 11 Tax Pol'y and the Economy 1, 6 (1997). The first 
two categories that Gentry and Hubbard list are returns to human capital, not inanimate 
capital. 
so See, e.g., id. at 22-24 (attempting to look at the distribution of inframarginal returns 
by comparing the value of q, the ratio of the market value of an asset, to its replacement 
cost for households, at different income levels). 
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and consumption taxes generally burden inframarginal returns. A 
wealth tax generally leaves inframarginal returns untaxed. 
L An I nco me Tax 
As an initial matter, an income tax captures a fixed percentage of 
any return, whether marginal or inframarginal. In the case of risky 
returns , taxation of the risk premium can be avoided effectively by 
shifting investment from the safe asset to the risky asset. By assump-
tion , however, a taxpayer already has chosen to invest the maximum 
amount in inframarginal investments.51 Therefore, there are no fur-
ther opportunities to shift investments from marginal to inframarginal 
investments. Thus, the inframarginal investment bears the full burden 
of the tax. 
n. A Consumption Tax 
A consumption tax does not burden investment (either risk-free or 
risky) because the tax savings from deferring consumption grows at 
the same rate as the deferred consumption. Thus, the consumption 
tax does not burden savings so long as there is an opportunity to in-
vest the deferred tax liability at the same rate as the deferred con-
sumption. With an inframarginal investment, the taxpayer already has 
chosen to invest the maximum amount in the inframarginal invest-
ment. Thus, the tax savings can be invested only at the lesser marginal 
rate. As a result, the tax savings is insufficient to fund the tax due on 
the deferred consumption and part of the return from the in-
framarginal investment must be used to pay the tax.52 
51 Even if the taxpayer wishes to consume currently and not save, she can invest in the 
inframarginal investment by borrowing. 
52 Assume that marginal investments earn at a rate r and that there is a single in-
framarginal investment available that earns at a rate g > r. Assume further that the most 
that can be invested in the inframarginal investment isS x (1- Tc). Consider, as in note 29, 
an individual who has S to invest. He can spend either S x (1 - Tc) currently (paying S x Tc 
in taxes) or save S. If he saves S, however, the most he can invest in the inframarginal 
investment is S x (1 - Tc)· The remaining S x Tc must be invested in the marginal invest-
ment. Thus, after one period, he has: 
(1 + g)S X (1 - Zc) + (1 + r)S X Z c. 
The expression can be rewritten as: 
[(1 + r)S X (1 - Zc) + (1 + r)S X Zc)] + (g - r)S X (1 - Zc)· 
The terms in the brackets are the marginal returns on the saved consumption and the saved 
taxes. As before, the marginal return on the deferred taxes is just sufficient to pay the tax 
on the marginal return on the deferred consumption. The term after the bracket is the 
excess inframarginal return on the deferred consumption. By assumption, there is no ex-
cess return on deferred taxes. As a result, part of the excess return on the deferred con-
sumption must be used to pay taxes. In particular, the excess rate of return would be 
reduced by a factor of 1 - Tc. 
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Example 6: Assume that there is a 40% tax-inclusive con-
sumption tax. T has a unique opportunity to invest up to $60 
with a yield of 25%. A ny further savings yield only the mar-
ket rate of 10%. T decides to defer $60 of consumption, in-
vesting the $60 in the unique investment. His decision to 
defer his consumption frees up $40 that otherwise would be 
due in current taxes. He invests the $40 in saved taxes at the 
market rate. 
T earns $15 on the $60 inframarginal investment and $4 on 
the $40 marginal investment. Thus, at the end of the period, 
he has $119.53 With $119, he can consume $71.40 and pay 
taxes of $47.60.54 By saving, he increases his consumption by 
only $11.40 (19% ), rather than $15 (25% ). Thus, the con-
sumption tax burdens his excess inframarginal return. 55 
ttL. A Wealth Tax 
Unlike the consumption or income tax, the wealth tax does not tax 
excess inframarginal returns. The argument is simple and again fol-
lows from the lump sum nature of the wealth tax. An ex ante wealth 
tax imposes the same burden whatever the return from the invest-
ment. Thus, if a taxpayer has an opportunity to invest in an in-
framarginal project, his tax liability from the project is exactly the 
same as it would be if he invested in a marginal project. No additional 
liability is generated by the excess return from the inframarginal 
investment. 
Another way to see that an ex ante wealth tax imposes no burden 
on the excess return is to consider an inframarginal investment funded 
entirely by debt. Assuming perfect debt markets, the interest cost on 
the debt equals the marginal yield. Thus, the net income from the 
project equals the excess return from the project. Since, however, the 
project is entirely debt-funded, the net worth of the project is zero and 
no tax is due. Thus, it is clear that there is no tax burden on the excess 
return. 
One could argue that the analysis above is incorrect. In particular, 
the net worth of a fully debt-funded inframarginal project is positive, 
not zero. Its value is the present value of the excess return. The op-
portunity to invest in an inframarginal project is an intangible asset 
53 $119 = ($60 X 1.25) + (40 X 1.10). 
54 $47.60 = 40% X $119. 
55 The inframarginal investment returns 25%, while the marginal investment returns 
only 10%. His excess return is , therefore , 15 % or $9. A 40% tax on $9 is $3.60, which is 
precisely the amount by which the tax has reduced his earnings. See note 52. 
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with positive value. A perfect wealth tax would tax such an intangible 
asset in the same manner as any other asset. The argument is that 
there are no inframarginal returns, only intangible assets that are not 
valued properly and taxed. No practical wealth tax, however, could 
include such intangible assets in its base. Thus, as a practical matter, if 
not a theoretical matter, the argument that a wealth tax will not tax 
inframarginal returns is correct. 
The argument, so far, is based on an ex ante and not an ex post 
wealth tax. As shown above, a single period ex post wealth tax is not 
equivalent to a single period ex ante wealth tax with respect to in-
framarginal returns.56 An ex post wealth tax includes excess in-
framarginal returns in the tax base. The difference between the ex 
ante and ex post wealth tax disappears , however, where the tax is peri-
odic. With a periodic tax the excess inframarginal return, not taxed in 
the period in which it is earned, enters the tax base for future periods. 
If the excess inframarginal return is consumed in the period earned, it 
escapes the wealth tax entirely. In this regard, the treatment of excess 
inframarginal returns is identical to the treatment of wages. 
The treatment of inframarginal returns by the various taxes is sum-
marized in the third row of Table 1.57 
d. Inflation 
Properly speaking, inflation is not a return to capital. Many taxes, 
however, fail to distinguish between real and inflationary increases in 
value and , in effect, treat inflation as part of an asset's yield. Absent 
proper adjustments, an income tax treats inflation as a taxable return. 
Generally, inflation is not a problem for either a consumption tax or a 
wealth tax.58 
56 See Subsection II.B.l. 
57 See page 516. 
58 The discussion in the text concerns mismeasurement of the tax base due to inflation. 
Inflation also causes structural problems for many taxes. In particular, whenever the com-
putation of tax liability is based on a fixed number of dollars, real tax liabilities vary with 
inflation. For example, inflation causes the value of personal exemptions and the size of 
tax brackets to shrink in real terms. The problem, often referred to as "bracket creep," is 
easily solved by indexing the brackets and other fixed dollar amounts. The Code is mostly, 
but not entirely, indexed to protect against bracket creep. Compare IRC § l(f) ("official" 
tax brackets fully indexed), with IRC § 15l(d) (tax bracket caused by phaseout of personal 
exemptions incompletely indexed). To the extent that a consumption or wealth tax had 
brackets, exemptions, credits, or similar fixed dollar amounts , indexing of such amounts 
would be necessary. See generally Reed Shuldiner, Indexing the Tax Code, 48 Tax L. Rev. 
537 (1993). 
Inflation also causes problems if there are delays between measurement of the tax base 
and payment of taxes. Such problems are relatively unimportant and relatively easy to 
control for so long as the rate of inflation is low or moderate. 
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L. An Income Tax 
The computation of income from capital, whether in the form of 
gain or loss, or in the form of periodic returns or deductions, generally 
can be made only by reference to dollar amounts from prior periods. 
Unless those dollar amounts are adjusted for inflation, the computa-
tion of income contains an amount that represents the effect of infla-
tion. While it is possible to adjust the computation of income to 
compensate for inflation ("indexing"), doing so is complex. Due in 
part to that complexity, the Code has never indexed income. Many 
provisions of the Code, such as preferential rates for capital gains59 
and accelerated depreciation60 have been justified, at least in part, as 
ad hoc corrections for inflation. 
Example 7: T purchases a share of stock for $100, selling it 
one year later for $110. In the intervening year, there has 
been 6% inflation. Under an unindexed income tax, T has 
$10 income, the difference between the amount received on 
sale and the purchase price. Stated in current dollars, how-
ever, Ts investment in the property, is not $100, but $106. In 
other words, in terms of Ts ability to purchase goods and 
services, T needs $106 dollars today to be as well off as he 
was if he spent the $100 one year ago. Ts real income is only 
$4, the difference between the amount realized on sale and 
the adjusted purchase price. The income tax could be in-
dexed by increasing Ts basis in the property to $106 to re-
flect the intervening inflation. 
n. A Consumption Tax 
Generally, a consumption tax does not need to be indexed for infla-
tion because the tax base is determined only by reference to current 
dollars. For example, a sales tax is imposed on the current sales price. 
With a cash flow type tax, the tax base is current receipts minus the 
amount currently saved. In either case, there is no need to resort to 
concepts such as basis measured in dollars from a prior period. 
Example 8: As in Example 7, T purchases a share of stock 
for $100 and sells it after one year for $110. T immediately 
uses the proceeds from the sale for consumption. Assume 
that there has been intervening inflation of 6%. In the first 
year, T would be permitted to deduct the $100 purchase. No 
59 See, e.g., IRC § l(h). 
60 See, e.g., IRC § 168. 
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adjustment is needed for inflation because the purchase is 
current. In the second year, T would include the $110 of 
consumption. Again, no adjustment is needed for inflation 
because the sale is current. While the effect of inflation 
would increase his tax liability in nominal terms by 6%, his 
real liability would be unaffected by inflation because he 
would be able to pay the tax in inflated dollars. 
tn. A Wealth Tax 
525 
Generally, as with a consumption tax, a wealth tax does not need to 
be indexed for inflation because the tax base is determined only by 
reference to current dollars. The only information that generally is 
required is the current value of assets and liabilities; no reference 
need be made to historical values. 
Example 9: T purchases the same share of stock as in Exam-
ple 7. T would have taxable wealth of $100 in the first pe-
riod, and taxable wealth of $110 in the second period. As a 
result of inflation, his nominal tax liability would be 6% 
higher in the second period. His real liability would be unaf-
fected by inflation because he would pay the tax in inflated 
dollars. 
The treatment of inflationary returns by the various taxes is summa-
rized in the fourth row of Table 1.61 
e. Summary 
The pure form of all income, consumption, and wealth taxes, bur-
den capital. There are, however, significant differences in how each 
taxes capital. An income tax taxes risk-free and inframarginal returns, 
but generally does not tax returns to risk. An income tax also may 
encourage greater risktaking as taxpayers act to offset the tax. A con-
sumption tax burdens neither the risk-free return nor returns to risk, 
but, as with the income tax, taxes inframarginal returns. Finally, a 
wealth tax imposes a lump sum tax on capital that can be viewed as a 
tax on the risk-free rate of return, but imposes no burden on either 
risky or inframarginal returns. Thus, if it is believed important to tax 
inframarginal returns, the wealth tax is a relatively unattractive form 
of taxation. 
61 See page 516. 
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The pure forms of the various taxes are likely to be neither politi-
cally nor adminstratively feasible. Thus , the choice between the taxes 
will depend on the compromises that must be made in order to enact 
an administrable tax. For example, the income tax is much more sen-
sitive to inflation than is the wealth or consumption tax. Thus, if infla -
tion is a problem, wealth and consumption taxes may be relatively 
more attractive than income taxes. 
4. A.dministrability 
A wealth tax has both obvious administrative problems and obvious 
advantages. The primary administrative difficulty is that a wealth tax 
requires that assets be valued on an annual basis. While many valua-
tion problems could be solved, there is no question that substantial 
problems would remain. One useful way to consider the significance 
of the valuation problem is to examine the percentage of all assets 
that are easy or hard to value. To get a feel for this issue, we use 
figures from the Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds accounts , which at-
tempt to identify all assets in the economy.62 
Table 2 divides up assets held by individuals into categories that 
seem easy, medium, or hard to value. Table 3 looks more specifically 
at the assets that are likely to be included in a wealth tax. We treat 
assets as easy to value if different people valuing those assets gener-
ally would reach more or less the same number in making the valua-
tion. For example, shares traded on a stock exchange are easy to 
value. This is a reasonable conclusion, although valuing a large block 
of such stock occasionally might raise issues that would make that par-
ticular block more difficult to value. We treat assets as of medium 
difficulty to value if we generally would expect different people valu-
ing those assets to reach roughly the same number, although we would 
not expect the numbers to be exactly the same. We treat an asset as 
hard to value if we would not be surprised that two people making a 
valuation of the asset came up with numbers that were significantly 
different. In making these evaluations, we take into account the 
amount one reasonably might expect to spend valuing an asset given 
the value of the asset. 
Although we have no data on the valuation of consumer durables, 
we expect they generally are difficult to value, given the likely costs of 
valuation compared to value. Any reasonable wealth tax is likely to 
exempt consumer durables below a threshold.63 For purposes of this 
62 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Guide to Flow of Funds Ac-
counts (1993) [hereinafter Flow of Funds). 
63 See Subsection III.D . for a fuller discussion of the trea tment of consumer durables. 
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TABLE 2 
AssET T oTALS FRoM FLow oF FuNDS AccouNTs-1994 
Tangible asse ts 
Owner-occupied housing 
Consumer durable goods 
Total Financial Assets 
Deposits 
Foreign deposi ts 
Checkable deposits and currency 
Time and savings deposits 
Money market fund shares 
Credit market instruments 
Open market paper 
U.S. government securities 
Treasury 
Savings bonds 
Other Treasury 
Agency 
Municipal securities 
Corporate and foreign bonds 
Mortgages 
Corporate equities 
Mutual fund shares 
Security credit 
Life insurance reserves 
Pension fund reserves 
Investment in bank personal trusts 
Equity in noncorporate business* 
Miscellaneous assets 
Total Assets 
$billions 
9,500 
7,282 
2,218 
19,169 
3,157 
19 
564 
2,224 
351 
1,930 
47 
913 
782 
180 
602 
131 
502 
353 
116 
3,071 
1,052 
109 
520 
4,948 
699 
3,405 
277 
28,669 
Percent of 
Total Assets 
33.1 
25.4 
7.7 
66.9 
11.0 
0.1 
2.0 
7.8 
1.2 
6.7 
0.2 
3.2 
2.7 
0.6 
2.1 
0.5 
1.7 
1.2 
0.4 
10.7 
3.7 
0.4 
1.8 
17.3 
2.4 
11.9 
1.0 
100.0 
* Includes direct investment in real estate other th an owner-occupied housing 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts of 
the United States, 1991-1999 (Mar. 10, 2000), tbl. B.lOO (Balance Sheet of Households and 
Nonprofit Organizations) , available at <http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/releases/zl/Current/ 
data.htm> (visited May 23, 2000). 
analysis, we include one-half of consumer durables and rate consumer 
durables as being of medium difficulty. 
Deposits generally are recorded at their current value and should 
be easy to value. There are markets for most U.S. government and 
municipal securities, and that should make them easy to value. There 
is trading in many corporate and foreign bonds. It should be easy to 
determine the value of a debt instrument rated by credit agencies. 
Although we do not have data on the extent of bonds that do not fit 
these criteria, we do not believe it is very great. 
It is possible to make tentative valuations of mortgages based on 
the projected cash flow of the instrument. It would be improvident , 
however, to value the mortgage without some determination of the 
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TABLE 3 
AssETS LIKELY TO BE TAXED UNDER A WEALTH TAx 
Amount 
included 
Difficulty of Valua tion in base Percent 
($billions) of Base Easy Medium Hard 
Consumer durable goods 1,109 7.4 7.4 
Foreign deposits 19 0.1 0.1 
Checkable deposits and currency 564 3.7 3.7 
Time and savings deposi ts 2,224 14.8 14.8 
Money market fund shares 351 2.3 2.3 
Open market paper 47 0.3 0.3 
Savings bonds 180 1.2 1.2 
Other treasury 602 4.0 4.0 
Agency 131 0.9 0.9 
Municipal securities 502 3.3 3.3 
Corporate and foreign bonds 353 2.3 2.3 
Mortgages 116 0.8 0.8 
Corporate equities 3,071 20.4 17.7 2.7 
Mutual fund shares 1,052 7.0 7.0 
Security credit 109 0.7 0.7 
Life insurance reserves 520 3.5 3.5 
Investment in bank personal trusts 699 4.6 4.6 
Equity in noncorporate business* 3,405 22.6 15.1 7.5 
Total 15,053 100.0 65.9 26.6 7.5 
* Includes direct investment in real estate other than owner-occupied housing 
value of the underlying property, and, in some cases, the creditworthi-
ness of the debtor. We have classified mortgages therefore as of me-
dium difficulty in valuing. 
In the case of corporate equities, publicly traded stock accounts for 
about 87% of the current market value of shares outstanding.64 Ac-
cordingly, 87% of the category is easy to value. We believe that the 
remainder of this category should present medium valuation difficul-
ties. The valuation of such interests is a fairly common necessity 
under the estate tax and the Service has set guidelines that should be 
used in that process.65 While there certainly are situations where the 
valuation process sparks significant controversy, we think that, on the 
whole, guidelines such as those set out by the Service in the past 
would put the valuations made into a reasonably narrow band. 
Mutual fund shares are issued by one of two types of funds. Open-
end funds generally have net asset values determined on a daily basis. 
64 Estimate of the Flow of Funds Section of the staff of the Federal Reserve Board. 
Telephone conversation with AI Teplin of that staff, May 17, 2000. 
65 R ev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, amplified in Rev. Rul. 83-120, 1983-2 C.B. 170. 
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Most closed-end funds are traded on an exchange and have quoted 
prices for their values. 66 Accordingly, these should be easy to value. 
Valuation of security credit is similar to the valuation of mortgages, 
except that the determinative issue is usually the creditworthiness of 
the debtor. We classify them of moderate difficulty to value. Trustees 
of bank personal trusts could be required to report the value of such 
trusts to the beneficiaries, which should make them easy to value. 
There is a wide range of assets in noncorporate businesses (partner-
ships and other unincorporated businesses), few of which are easy to 
value.67 We tentatively have characterized two-thirds of noncorporate 
business assets as moderately difficult to value and one-third as hard 
to value. 
Given our division of the assets into the three categories, we esti-
mate that 66% of assets would be easy to value and 7.5% of assets 
would be hard to value.6s 
One helpful aspect of the wealth tax is that the rate of tax on net 
worth is relatively low, 1.57% in our base case. This means that, while 
valuation problems might exist, they might not create the practical 
problems that at first might appear to arise. For example, a disagree-
ment about the value of stock in the range of a $20,000 difference 
between the taxpayer and the administrator translates into an argu-
ment over $314 of tax when the tax is 1.57%. Thus, one can speculate 
that, as long as the tax administrators do not take too idiosyncratic a 
view of valuation, relatively few disagreements over value would be 
worth taking beyond an administrative level.69 
The fact that the wealth tax is structured with a single rate has clear 
administrative advantages. One of the thorny issues in a progressive 
income tax is to whom to attribute any given item of income. Progres-
sive consumption and wealth taxes raise similar issues. A single tax 
rate substantially lessens such issues because the amount of tax to be 
collected generally is unaffected by the identity of the taxpayer. 
66 Richard B. Stephens, Guy B. Maxfield, Stephen A. Lind & Dennis A. Calfee, Federal 
Estate and Gift Taxation ~ 4.02[3][d] (7th ed., 1997). 
67 Although noncorporate businesses have some easy-to-value assets such as bank de-
posits and traded securities, their main assets are trade receivables, equipment and 
software, inventories, and real estate. See Flow of Funds, note 62, tbl. B.l02. Trade receiv-
ables are monetized in commercial markets and can be valued with some accuracy. Studies 
suggest that real estate can be appraised with errors that vary from 3% to 10% of value, 
depending partly on the skill of the appraiser and partly on the type of real estate involved 
(residential, raw land, and the like). See Richard A. Graff & MichaelS. Young, The Mag-
nitude of Random Appraisal Error in Commercial Real Estate Valuation, 17 J. Real Est. 
Res. 33 (1999), which includes a summary of prior research in the area. 
68 See Table 3 on page 528. 
69 The statement in the text ignores the effect of a current valuation on future valua-
tions. To the extent that a current valuation was precedent for the future, the stakes could 
be considerably higher. 
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Unfortunately, even if there is only one nonzero rate , there is also 
an implicit or explicit zero rate in any realistic tax system. Those 
under the exemption level, and perhaps foreign persons and exempt 
entities face the zero rate.7° Thus, for example, there is an incentive 
to vest ownership (or taxpaying status) in a person who has an unused 
exemption amount. As long as the exemption amounts are modest, 
however, taxpayers generally ·.vould not find major tax planning initia-
tives worthwhile. Moreover, it is always possible to reduce exemp-
tions for dependents to reduce the opportunity to shift wealth.71 
The use of a single rate also potentially offers significant advantages 
for collection of the tax. When the tax rate is independent of the 
owner of an asset, any holder of the asset can be made liable for the 
wealth tax without regard to the true beneficial owner. For example, 
if one wished to include the value of defined benefit retirement ac-
counts in the wealth tax base, it would be possible to impose the tax 
on the retirement plan rather than the individual beneficiaries whose 
interests in the plan may be quite contingent. Of course, by doing so, 
we potentially tax individuals who might be entitled to an exemption. 
Thus, care must be exercised in choosing when to impose tax at other 
than the taxpayer level. The problem of the exemption could be dealt 
with by treating the tax as a withholding tax and imputing the assets 
and the tax payment to the beneficiaries. Treating the entity level tax 
as a mere withholding tax, however, might significantly reduce the ad-
ministrative advantage of imposing the tax at the entity level. 
Even where the identity of an owner and the value of his interest is 
clear, it may be advantageous to collect the tax at source. Thus, for 
example, banks could pay the tax with respect to deposits. Whether 
such a system would be politically feasible is, of course, another 
question. 
Corporations probably raise the most serious collection and valua-
tion issues. We assume that, at the very least, corporations would con-
tinue to be used as tax collection vehicles. Thus, the tax on some 
portion of a corporation's value would be collected at the corporate 
level. The tax could be collected on the value of the equity in the 
corporation or on all value, including value owned by debtholders. A 
second issue is how the value of the corporation would be determined. 
One possibility would be to value all assets and liabilities of the corpo-
70 We have not made any serious attempt so far to deal with foreign persons or exempt 
entities. The failure to do so does not represent a belief that such questions are unimpor-
tant. To the contrary, we believe that they must be dealt with in any realistic proposal. 
71 In the context of the income tax, shifting to dependents is limited by, among other 
provisions, the elimination of exemptions for dependents, IRC § 151( d) , limitations on 
standard deductions for dependents, § 63(c), and the "kiddie tax," IRC § 1(g). Of the 
three provisions, only the kiddie tax responds to shifting due to progressive rates. 
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ration. Another way would be to value all interests in the corpora-
tion.72 It seems likely that valuing the interests in publicly traded 
corporations would prove to be administratively superior to valuing 
the assets. It is likely that the decision would go the other way for 
privately held corporations. 
It is worth noting that there would be collateral effects to the deci-
sion as to how to value the corporation. For example, imagine a cor-
poration that had substantial contingent tort liabilities. It is likely that 
it would be impossible (and probably undesirable) to tax the tort vic-
tims on their contingent claims. It might be seen, therefore, as desira-
ble to deny the tortfeasor a deduction. If the corporation were valued 
as the sum of its assets and liabilities, it would be possible to treat 
certain liabilities as nondeductible. If, however, the corporation were 
valued by reference to the value of its shares, the contingent liability 
implicitly would be deductible.73 
We also need to determine whether the wealth tax paid by the cor-
poration is a final tax or a mere withholding tax. Given the flat tax 
rate, we think it would be sensible to treat the tax as a final tax, which 
also would have the effect of taxing foreign persons and exempt orga-
nizations on their stock ownership. 
The wealth tax described here is unlike the current estate and gift 
tax, and indeed, we do not consider whether the estate and gift tax 
should be preserved in a world in which a wealth tax replaces the in-
come tax. Given the different purposes of the two taxes, there is no 
necessary relationship between the enactment of a wealth tax and the 
repeal of the estate and gift tax. Moreover, since the bases of the 
wealth tax and the estate and gift tax are similar, enactment of the 
wealth tax would make enforcement of the estate and gift tax much 
easier. Certain classes of transactions that people engage in to avoid 
the estate and gift tax generally are not relevant to a wealth tax since 
the transfer of assets from one person to another would not affect the 
application of a uniformly applied wealth tax (except to the extent the 
transferee is an untaxed individual (such as a foreigner) or is pro-
tected from tax by credits). 
72 For articles discussing the possibility of using the market value of corporations to 
determine the corporate income for purposes of the corporate income tax, see Joseph 
Bankman, A Market Value Based Corporate Income Tax, 68 Tax Notes 1347, 1348-49 
(Sept. 11, 1995); MichaelS. Knoll, An Accretion Corporate Income Tax, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 
4-16 (1996). 
73 Of course, it would be possible to add certain liabilities back into the value of the 
corporation. Doing so, however, would substantially complicate administration. 
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III. THE WEALTH TAX BASE 
A major issue in designing a wealth tax is the definition of wealth. 
The following Subsections discuss possible components of taxable 
wealth that we considered separately. 
A . Financial Holdings 
There is little question that financial holdings would be a core part 
of the base of a wealth tax. This category includes investment securi-
ties and bank accounts. Financial holdings are likely to be the easiest 
category of assets to subject to a wealth tax.74 
B. Businesses 
We would expect that those who own businesses would be taxed on 
their value although the treatment of business owners raises a number 
of problems. First, small businesses are likely to be some of the most 
difficult assets to value. Second, as discussed below, small businesses 
raise some of the thorniest questions in determining whether income 
is from labor (which would be taxed under our wage tax) or capital 
(which would be exempt). 
An obvious question is whether there should be any special rules 
for small businesses. Two separate arguments justify special treatment 
of small businesses. First, as an administrative matter, it may be diffi-
cult and inefficient to include the assets of very small businesses, par-
ticularly where the assets may be hard to distinguish from what may 
be excluded personal assets. Second, it may be viewed as desirable to 
subsidize small businesses by imposing a reduced tax on them. For 
example, the current income tax permits small businesses to expense 
up to $20,000 in equipment purchases per year.75 By analogy, it would 
be possible to exempt a specified amount of new equipment purchases 
from the wealth tax. Special valuation rules also could be employed 
to reduce either the administrative or tax burden on small businesses. 
For purposes of our estimations, we assume that there are no special 
rules for small businesses. 
C. Other Investment Assets 
Real estate investments and other nonsecurity investments (such as 
collectibles-the proverbial Rembrandts in the vault) presumably also 
would be subject to tax. As the investment becomes less fungible, val-
74 We assume that municipal bonds would be included as taxable financial assets. 
75 IRC § 179. The figure in the text is for 2000. The § 179 limit is scheduled to increase 
in stages until it reaches $25,000 in 2003. 
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uation questions arise of the type previously discussed in connection 
with the administrability of a wealth tax system.76 
D. Consumer Durables 
When the Rembrandt is moved into the parlor, the question of tax-
ing it becomes more complicated. It is not feasible to tax the value of 
every asset owned by individuals. We hope to avoid many of the prac-
tical aspects of this issue by including some general exemptions in the 
structure of the tax.77 We do not favor, however, a blanket exemption 
for consumer durables. Our justification for taxing some consumer 
durables is two-fold. First, the line between consumer durables and 
investment assets is often ambiguous. An unlimited exemption for 
consumer durables would put great pressure on the difference. Sec-
ond, if the picture on the parlor wall is worth $10 million, it is reason-
able to tax it regardless of the owner's intention in buying it. We 
imagine that a realistic wealth tax would exempt a certain amount 
(maybe $10,000-$50,000) of consumer durables. We have not, how-
ever, built an explicit consumer goods exemption into our numerical 
estimates because our data set, the Survey of Consumer Finances, 
does not contain detailed information about each respondent's con-
sumer goods. We believe that the consumer goods (furniture, kitchen-
ware, and the like) that are omitted from the survey responses are 
probably similar to the kind and amount that would be exempt under 
an actual wealth tax. Thus, in effect, we consider an exemption for 
consumer durables to be built into the data. 
E. Retirement Assets 
The current income tax gives special treatment to retirement sav-
ings_78 A politically realistic wealth tax is likely to do the same. The 
rationale for the favorable income tax treatment derives from the 
country's retirement policy and has nothing to do with income tax pol-
icy. These same considerations are likely to dictate favorable treat-
ment for retirement savings under a wealth tax. 
Accordingly, for our base case, we assumed that assets held in quali-
fied retirement accounts would not be subject to the net worth portion 
of the wealth tax. We also assumed that amounts contributed to re-
tirement accounts would be excluded from the wage tax and that 
amounts withdrawn from retirement accounts would be taxable as 
76 See Subsection II.B.4. 
77 See text accompanying note 113. 
78 See generally IRC §§ 401-418E (qualified plans), § 219 (deduction for individual re-
tirement account contributions). 
S'"'il. ..) , TAX LAW REVI E W 
wages. Given the fiat rate of the wage tax, the treatment in the base 
case is essentially equivalent to denying a deduction for retirernent 
contributions and excluding all amounts received from a retirement 
account from the wage tax. 79 Differences between the two treatments 
would arise if the tax rate in the year of contribution differed from 
that in the year of distribution or if the contribution limit was not 
properly adjusted as between the two possible approaches. 
While our base case assumes that retirement accounts would con-
tinue to be tax-free, we also tried to estimate the wealth tax assuming 
a positive rate on retirement accounts. While aggregate numbers on 
retirement assets are available , it is difficult to otain accurate figures 
on an individual basis. With aggregate figures, it is possible to make a 
reasonable estimate of the revenue that could be collected with a tax 
on retirement assets, but not to distribute the tax by income or wealth 
groups. Moreover, it is impossible to take into account the reduction 
m revenue due to the use of tax credits that otherwise would be 
unusable. 
F. Life Insurance 
For term life insurance, the taxable asset generally would be the 
value of paid, but unaccrued, premiums. Thus, for example, assume a 
taxpayer has an annual premium of $1,000 and pays the premium on 
April 1, the beginning of the policy period. As of December 31, the 
approximate value of his contract would be $250, the premium for the 
remaining three months of the contract. Given the relatively small 
value of such contracts, we suspect it would not be worthwhile includ-
ing term life insurance in the wealth tax base, particularly at the level 
of the individual contract holder. In some cases, a term life policy 
may be substantially more valuable. For example, term insurance 
polices frequently guarantee continued insurance without the need for 
subsequent medical examinations.80 Such a right can be quite valua-
ble for someone with declining health. Even within a single year, a 
holder of insurance whose health has significantly declined owns a val-
uable asset. Any attempt to value life insurance based on the health 
of the insured would likely pose serious valuation problems and be 
79 The treatment in the base case is equivalent to the treatment of a traditional deducti-
ble IRA. IRC § 408. The alternative treatment is equivalent to the treatment of a Roth 
IRA. IRC § 408A. 
so Term policies also frequently provide for a level payment for five , ten, or twenty 
years. With such policies , the price of the insurance generally is overstated for the early 
periods and understated for the later periods. Thus , after the first payment or so, the 
owner of the policy has a valuable right to continue to purchase insurance at a below-
marke t rate. The aggregate value of such rights is not likely to be that significant. 
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poorly received by the public. It is unlikely, therefore, that we would 
vvish to tax individuals in such circumstances. 
If it was believed desirable to tax term life insurance contracts , it 
would be much simpler to tax the contracts at the company level. 8 1 
Taxing at the company level could be accomplished by denying a de-
duction for reserves. If the wealth tax on corporate assets were im-
posed at the corporate level , denying a deduction for reserves would 
be straightforward. If the wealth tax on corporate assets were im-
posed at the shareholder level, a surrogate tax on the policyholder 
could be imposed as a excise tax on the life insurance company's 
reserves. In either case, we would expect the incidence of the tax to 
be on the policyholders. 
vVhole life policies, however, represent a significant source of 
wealth. According to Table 2, life insurance reserves are $505 billion, 
or 1.8% of assets. Currently, income on life insurance reserves gener-
ally is not taxed.82 In the base case, we include the cash value of 
whole life insurance. For reasons of administrability and politics, it 
may be preferable to impose the tax at the life insurance company 
level. 
G. Housing 
The income tax gives favorable treatment to home ownership. Even 
in 1986, when many sacred cows were slaughtered, the favorable treat-
ment of home ownership emerged essentially unscathed.83 We think 
that it is unrealistic to base a wealth tax on the assumption that homes 
would be taxed like other assets. The exact scope of the exemption, 
however, is open to question. The two basic approaches are to ex-
clude the gross value of housing or to exclude the value of housing net 
of mortgage liabilities. Excluding the net value of housing is 
equivalent to excluding both the home and the mortgage from the tax 
base.84 Within the two basic approaches, it is possible to provide for a 
variety of limitations, such as a cap on excluded housing, a cap on 
81 The problem of term life insurance is essentially the same as with any other prepaid 
contract. Examples would include automobile and homeowner 's insurance, magazine sub-
scriptions, and tuition. 
82 IRC § 101. 
83 With the possible exception of the $1 million cap on acquisition indebtedness, the 
limitations on home mortgage interest imposed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 
No. 99-514, § 511, 100 Stat. 2085, 2244, and revised by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10,102, 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-84, probably are better seen 
as attempts to prevent the home mortgage interest deduction from expanding in light of 
the general disallowance of personal interest , rather than attempts to actually cut back on 
the deduction. See IRC § 163(h). 
84 Since the home is an asset, excluding it from the tax base reduces tax liability. Since 
the mortgage is a liability, excluding it from the tax base increases tax liability. 
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excluded mortgages, or a limitation on the number of qualified 
residences. 
For our base case, we exclude only the net value of homes and limit 
the exclusion to $1 million. Thus, for example, if an individual had a 
home with a fair market value of $250,000 and a mortgage of $200,000, 
$50,000 of the value of the home would be excluded. This is 
equivalent to excluding the home and the mortgage from the wealth 
tax. If the individual had a home worth $6 million with a mortgage of 
$2.4 million, she would be permitted to exclude $1 million of the net 
value of the home. In other words, she would exclude the $2.4 million 
mortgage and $3.4 million of the value of the home, including in her 
wealth tax base only the remaining $2.6 million in net value of the 
home. 
Our base case represents a significant reduction in the exclusion 
permitted under current law. Under current law, taxpayers generally 
are permitted to deduct interest on home mortgages of up to $1 mil-
lion85 and are permitted to exclude the entire amount of imputed in-
come from home ownership. The equivalent treatment under a 
wealth tax would be to exclude mortgages up to $1 million from the 
tax base and to exclude the entire gross, not net, value of homes. If 
we adopted such treatment in the wealth tax, a homeowner with a 
$250,000 home and $200,000 mortgage would be able to exclude the 
entire $250,000 gross value of his home and still use the $200,000 
mortgage to offset other wealth. Similarly, a homeowner with a $6 
million home and a $2.4 million mortgage would be permitted to ex-
clude the entire $6 million home from the tax base while still using $1 
million of the mortgage to offset other assets. 
Although we have not chosen to follow the example of the income 
tax, we recognize that there are both equity and efficiency arguments 
in favor of excluding housing while still permitting a deduction for 
home mortgages. Limiting the exclusion to net housing wealth penal-
izes individuals who finance a home purchase with a mortgage. Such a 
penalty is disturbing for reasons that can be described as both hori-
zontal and vertical equity. From the viewpoint of horizontal equity, it 
makes no sense to impose different tax liabilities on two individuals 
merely because one has borrowed against her home and the other has 
borrowed against some other asset. From the viewpoint of vertical 
equity, wealthier individuals are more likely to be able to fund home 
purchases out of equity or by borrowing against other assets. Thus, 
the exclusion of mortgage debt would tend to reduce the progressivity 
of the tax structure. Moreover, given the (self-imposed) constraint of 
a flat wealth tax, the ability to compensate for the exclusion is limited. 
ss IRC § 163(h). 
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From the viewpoint of efficiency, any tax-induced shift from mortgage 
debt to nonmortgage debt would be expected to represent an effi-
ciency loss to society. 
We provide estimates of the wealth tax under several alternative 
assumptions including a scenario meant to mimic current law and a 
scenario without any special treatment of housing. 
H. Liabilities (Other Than iVlortgage Debt) 
The wealth tax is intended to be a tax on net worth, not on gross 
wealth. Thus, the fair market value of liabilities generally should be 
deductible from the tax base. In certain cases, it is likely that liabili-
ties would receive special treatment. For example, as discussed above, 
home mortgage debt is excluded in the base case.86 Also, it is likely to 
be desirable to adopt special valuation rules for many types of debt. 87 
For example, consumer debt is likely to be valued at face. 88 Finally, as 
discussed below, special rules are likely to be required for contingent 
liabilities. 
I. Contingent Assets and Liabilities 
Many assets are difficult to value because they represent highly con-
tingent claims. For example, a tort victim may have a valuable contin-
gent claim against a tortfeasor without even being aware of the claim. 
It would be impractical to include such claims in the tax base. At the 
same time, the tortfeasor will have an identical contingent liability, 
which may be only slightly easier to value than the contingent claim. 
The obvious solution is to ignore both, thus, generally insuring the 
correct tax base, if not necessarily the correct taxpayers. 
86 Home mortgage debt should be included to the extent that it exceeds the fair market 
value of the home. 
87 Historically, with the income tax, there has been a much greater willingness to accept 
debt at face value. In recent years, there has been a push towards finding methods to value 
debt more accurately. Even, in complex transactions, however, there is a preference for set 
valuation rules rather than true fair market value. See, e.g., IRC § 1274 (generally permit-
ing taxpayers to value assets based on an above-market interest rate and, in the case of a 
below-market interest rate, only increases the rate to the federal borrowing rate). For a 
more recent example, see the special valuation rules for valuing certain debt contributed to 
a FASIT. IRC § 8601. 
88 A separate decision would have to be made as to whether holders of consumer debt 
would be required to include the asset at face or at fair market value. For example, if 
holders of distressed consumer debt were required to include such debt at face value, the 
likely revenue loss on the consumer side from overstated liabilities would be made up by 
increased liability on the holder side. Such treatment, however, would raise the cost of 
consumer debt and may be politically unattractive. Of course, under current law, taxpay-
ers generally cannot deduct interest on consumer debt while holders must include the in-
terest, and there seems to be little pressure to change this result. 
538 TAX LAW REVIE W [Vol. 53: 
There are several problems, however, with simply ignoring contin-
gent claims and liabilities. First, doing so requires identifying those 
assets and liabilities that are too contingent to value. H olders would 
have an incentive to argue that the claims are too contingent to value, 
while those with liabilities would argue that they are sufficiently fixed 
to take into account.89 Presumably, rules could be developed to clar-
ify the line between contingent and noncontingent claims. Second , 
where one side of a transaction was a foreign person or otherwise not 
a taxpayer, ignoring the contingent claim/liability would not be 
neutral 
Finally, ignoring the contingent claim would not work if the assets 
of a corporation were valued by reference to the value of the interests 
in the corporation. Failing to include the claims in the wealth tax ba-
ses of the holder of the claim would reduce the tax base. 
]. Human Capital and the Wage Tax 
A s an initial theoretical matter, there does not appear to be any 
reason to treat human capital differently from any other source of 
wealth. A tax system that taxed only inanimate wealth and failed to 
tax human capital would make little sense from either an equity or 
efficiency point of view. From an equity standpoint, such a tax would 
discriminate against savers to an unacceptable degree.9° Compare, for 
example , Spendthrift and Saver. Spendthrift earns $200,000 per year 
and spends it all on riotous living (or for that matter on pious contem-
plation). Saver earns only $50,000 per year and by living frugally 
saves $20,000. After 10 years , Spendthrift has accumulated nothing 
and, assuming a 5% rate of return, Saver has accumulated about 
$260,000. If the wealth tax were designed with a modest credit of 
$1 ,900 and was intended to replace both the personal and corporate 
income taxes, it would require a rate of about 5.7 % .91 At that rate , 
Spendthrift would owe nothing and Saver would owe about $14,800, 
more than 100% of his income from his savings. Such a result is ab-
surd. From an efficiency point of view, such a high rate on wealth 
would act as a severe disincentive to save. 
We therefore turn to human capital , an important category of 
wealth that does not show up on most balance sheets. Taxing human 
capital raises all sorts of questions. Measuring human capital is 
fraught with difficulties. We assumed that it would be wrong, or at 
89 Similar problems under the current income tax are muted by the requirement of eco-
nomic performance before accruing a liability. IRC § 461(h). 
90 We use the term "savers" to refer to people who invest in inanimate capital. Educa-
tion is an example of a investment in human capital. 
91 See Table 11 on page 555. 
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least unacceptable, to tax people (such as academics?) based on how 
much income they could earn if they conducted themselves according 
to their most profitable use. Therefore, we chose to tax human capital 
measured by the amount of income actually earned by the taxpayer. 
Of course, considerations of administrability dictate such a solution, 
even if moral and political considerations did not. 
We considered taxing human capital , as so evidenced, based on two 
alternative structures. Under a simple structure, we would look at 
how much a person earns and translate that amount into a figure for 
human capital based on a uniform capitalization measure. For exam-
ple , if we concluded that salaries represent a 15% return on 
(nondepreciating) human capital, then human capital would equal 6.7 
times each person's salary. Hence, we would tax salaries at 6.7 times 
the rate otherwise applied to wealth. For example, using this 15% 
assumption, we could tax all other wealth at 2% and salaries at 13.3%. 
Whatever the justification for the simplified method, it is in effect a 
fiat-rate wage tax. 
A more sophisticated approach to human capital would take into 
account not only the current return on a person's human capital but 
also the expected useful life of the human capital asset. Thus, if we 
are really trying to measure human capital, we would rightly conclude 
that a healthy 25-year old making $40,000 has more human capital 
than a 65-year old making $40,000. 
Obviously, these two approaches have very different effects on the 
burden a wealth tax would impose on taxpayers of different ages. The 
method chosen would depend on one's justification for choosing a 
wealth tax. A purist might argue that wealth is the appropriate base, 
human capital is part of wealth, and the value of human capital should 
be measured as accurately as possible. On the other hand, if one felt 
that income was the right base on which a tax should be imposed, one 
nevertheless might choose a wealth tax with respect to assets other 
than human capital because of the great difficulty in trying to measure 
the income from those other assets. Since, however, wages are gener-
ally easy to measure, one could apply an income tax directly to 
wages.92 Even if one believed that wealth was a better measure of 
ability to pay than income when dealing with inanimate wealth, one 
still might believe that wages were a better measure of ability to pay 
than a more accurate measure of human capital. Thus, for example, 
one might be happy to dispense with the realization requirement for 
inanimate capital, but not for human capital. 
92 Except where the context makes it clear otherwise, we use the term wages to refer to 
all forms of earned income. 
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At least for now, we decided to use a straight wage tax in lieu of a 
more complicated capitalization method. First, any more complex sys-
tem would have to use a very limited amount of data in order to deter-
mine the value of each individual's human capital. The most likely 
approach would use only the individual's age and his earned income 
for the year to determine his human capital. Such a system likely 
would be seen as highly arbitrary and unfair. In addition, any system 
that imposed different tax rates based on age would increase adminis-
trative costs.93 Second, we believe that there are serious limitations 
on the ability to borrow against human capital. Therefore, a realiza-
tion-based system is likely to be fairer than a system that taxes based 
on future earning potential. 
Essentially, therefore, our "wealth" tax consists of two taxes, a tax 
on earned income and a tax on inanimate wealth. We refer to the tax 
on earned income as a wage tax. We refer to the tax on inanimate 
wealth as a tax on net worth. Collectively, we refer to the taxes as a 
wealth tax. Having two essentially separate taxes means that, for any 
given revenue target, it is possible to vary the tax between a pure 
wage tax and a pure inanimate wealth tax by varying the respective 
tax rates. 
Whatever method is chosen for capitalizing wages, the co-existence 
of a wage tax and net worth tax poses what could be a serious admin-
istrative problem with our wealth tax. The consequence of opting for 
a wealth tax in respect of inanimate assets is that the income from 
those assets is not taxed. Specifically, the earnings from a business 
would not be taxed to the owner, although the salary he received from 
the business would be. It is, however, notoriously difficult to distin-
guish the salary of a business owner from the return the owner gets 
from owning the business. 
Of course, the problem of distinguishing earned and unearned in-
come is not unknown under the income tax. For example, for closely 
held C corporations, it is necessary to distinguish between deductible 
salary and nondeductible dividends.94 Under current law, in theory, 
the self-employment tax should be imposed only on earned income, 
yet no attempt is made to distinguish between earned and unearned 
income of sole proprietors. Similarly, § 911 is supposed to be an ex-
clusion only for earned income of U.S. taxpayers resident abroad.95 
93 For example, an age-based system also generally would provide an incentive to defer 
compensation to a later year with a smaller multiplier. 
94 Interestingly, with a wealth tax, the Service would find it was on the other side of the 
traditional salary versus dividend dispute. 
95 Prior to 1981, a maximum tax rate applied to earned income. Former IRC § 1348, 
repealed by The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 101, 95 Stat. 
172, 183. Congress repealed § 1348 when it lowered general tax rates. 
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Nevertheless, given the high stakes under the wealth tax, we would 
expect the problem to be more troublesome. 
There are, however, countervailing factors that may limit the extent 
to which a taxpayer's ability to characterize salary as dividends or re-
tained earnings can be used to avoid the wealth tax. In particular, one 
of the most common ways that businesses are valued is by reference to 
the present value of the earnings of the business. Thus, if a taxpayer 
recharacterizes salary as a dividend or retained earnings, the addi-
tional net profits potentially will increase the valuation of the business 
not merely by the amount of the earnings, but also by the present 
value of a stream of income equal to the earnings.96 
Whether, given the effect on valuation, it would remain in the tax-
payer's interest to characterize the salary as a dividend would depend 
on a variety of factors including the relative rates as between the wage 
and net worth taxes, the expected life of the business, and the discount 
rate used to value the business. An example may help clarify the 
ISSUe. 
Example 10: T is the sole shareholder and employee of a 
corporation that is engaged in a service business with no tan-
gible assets. The business produces $10,000 of profit before 
payment of wages. Assume that net worth was taxed at 1.5% 
and wages were taxed at 15%. Assume that the business was 
valued for purposes of the net profit tax by discounting its 
earnings stream at 6%. 
If the business pays wages of $10,000 toT, he would have a 
wage tax liability of $1 ,500. Since the net profits of the busi-
ness are zero, the business would have a valuation of zero 
and there would be no net worth tax on the business. 
If the business pays a dividend of $10,000, T would have 
no wage tax liability. The net profits of the business, how-
ever, will have increased to $10,000. If it is assumed that the 
business will produce annual earnings of $10,000 for an ex-
pected life of 10 years, the business would be valued at 
$73,601 and T would owe a net worth tax of $1,104.97 By 
treating his salary as a dividend, T would have reduced his 
net tax liability by $396 (26% ). 
If, however, it was assumed that the income would con-
tinue for 15 years, the value of the business would increase to 
$97,122 and the net worth tax would increase to $1,457, a 
96 We are grateful to Professor James Repetti for pointing out to us the interplay be-
tween wages and the value of a business discussed here. 
97 $73,601 is the present value at 6% of $10,000 per year for 10 years. $1,104 = $73,601 x 
1.5 %. 
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savings of only $43 ( 4% ). If it was assumed that the income 
would continue for 20 years, the value of the business would 
increase to $114,699 and the net worth tax would increase to 
$1,720, $220 more than the wage tax (15%). 
IV. AN OVERVIEW OF A WEALTH TAX 
Before we examine a wealth tax based on disaggregate data, we use 
aggregate data to get an overview of what a wealth tax might look 
like. In this Section, we look at the rates that would be required if a 
wealth tax replaced either the current personal income tax or both the 
personal and corporate income taxes. We offer rates using a variety of 
wealth tax bases. 
For these computations we use the wealth data from the Federal 
Reserve's Flow of Funds data shown in Tables 2 and 3.98 For data on 
earned income, we use estimates drawn from the Internal Revenue 
Service's Statistics of Income.99 We assume no exemptions or cred-
its.100 Estimates of personal and corporate income taxes also are 
taken from the Statistics of Income. All data is for 1994. 
Aggregate personal income tax collections for 1994 were approxi-
mately $538 billion.101 Aggregate corporate tax collections were ap-
proximately $138 billion.l02 Combined collections were therefore 
$676 billion. The necessary rate on net worth depends on essentially 
three variables: the size of the asset base, the rate on earned income, 
and the taxes being replaced. Table 4 shows the necessary tax rate on 
net worth under various combinations of these parameters. 
The broadest tax base, including all assets and liabilities in the 
household sector, is shown in Row 1.103 Assuming no wage tax, a rate 
of 2.8% on net worth would be required to replace the individual and 
98 See pages 527-28. 
99 IRS Statistics of Income 1994: Individual Income Tax Returns (1997) [hereinafter 
SOl]. Our estimate of earned incomes include wages and salaries, pensions, net business 
and professional income, one-half of partnership and subchapter S income, and unemploy-
ment compensation. 
100 Although we assume no exemptions or credits, the SOl includes data only on filers. 
Id. at 19. Thus, we implicitly exempt low income individuals from the wage portion of the 
wealth tax. 
101 There are a variety of different definitions of the taxes paid in the SOL We use "total 
income tax" and then add back in "earned income credit used to offset income tax before 
credits." See id. at 36 tbl. 1.3, col. 2. Total income tax includes the alternative minimum 
tax. Id. at 128. 
102 See IRS, Statistics of Income Bull. 214 tbl. 17 (fiscal year 1994 corporate tax collec-
tions of $154,205 million), 216 tbl. 18 (fiscal year 1994 corporate tax refunds of $16,251 
million) (Summer 1999). 
tm The "broadest base" could be expanded further by the addition of assets owned by 
nonprofits and foreign persons. 
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T ABLE 4 
TA X RATE S B A SED ON A GGR EGATE WEALT H 
(No ExEMPTION P HOVIDED) 
Descrip lion of 
included assers and 
liabilities 
A 
1 A ll assets and 
liabilities included 
2 Line 1 minus pensions 
and life insurance 
3 Line 2 minus housing 
assets and mortgages, 
and one-half of 
consumer durables 
4 Line 3 with mortgage 
liabilities included 
Ner wonh 
in base 
(billions) 
B 
$24,230 
18,870 
13,571 
10.475 
Base as % 
of all 
assels and 
liabilities 
c 
100 
78 
56 
43 
Required lax rate on nel wor!h 
Individual 
& corporme Individual only 
With Wii/1 
Withoul 15 % Wirh out 15% 
wage tax wage tax wage tax wage tax 
D E F G 
2.8 0.6 2.2 0.04 
3.6 0.8 2.9 0.1 
5.0 1.1 4.0 0.1 
6.5 1.4 5.2 0.1 
corporate income taxes, and 2.2% for the personal income tax only. 
With a 15% wage tax, the rate on net worth would drop to .6% and 
.4% for the personal income tax only. These rates are quite low. 
They are unrealistic, however, because of the likelihood that the base 
would be considerably narrower. 
The next smaller base would exclude net pensions and life insur-
ance. This exclusion reduces the base from about $24.2 trillion to 
about $18.9 trillion, 78 % of the full base. Due to the reduction in 
base, the required rates on net worth to replace both taxes increase to 
3.6% with no wage tax and .8% with a wage tax. 
If homes, home mortgages, and one-half of consumer durables are 
removed from the base, the base falls to $13.6 trillion, 56% of the full 
base, and the required rates on net worth increase to 5% without the 
wage tax and 1.1% with the wage tax. Finally, if home mortgages are 
included in the base, the base is further reduced to $10.5 trillion, 43% 
of the full base. The required rates on net worth would increase fur-
ther to 6.5% and 1.4%, without and with the wage tax, respectively. 
The results in this Section are necessarily very rough. Most signifi-
cantly, they do not take into account personal exemptions or credits, 
the presence of which could increase rates substantially. Nevertheless, 
they are useful in giving a preliminary idea of the amount of outstand-
ing assets and the rates necessary to replace income taxes. 
In the next Section, we describe the data set that we use to look at 
wealth on a disaggregate level, the Survey of Consumer Finance. In 
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the following Sections, we examine a wealth tax based on that data 
set. 
V. TnE DATA SET-THE SuRvEY OF CoNSUMER FINANCES 
In order to study the wealth tax on an individual level, rather than 
on a purely aggregate level, we need information on individual wealth 
holdings . The most comprehensive source of such information is the 
Survey of Consumer Finances (the "SCF"), which is compiled by the 
Federal Reserve Board every three years. 104 In this Article, we use 
data from the 1995 survey. The SCF is designed to be used for study-
ing wealth. So, while a part of the sample is chosen randomly, the 
SCF also uses information from high-income tax returns to identify a 
fuller sample of high-wealth taxpayers. 
The SCF compiles extensive information on each respondent in the 
sample. A respondent is generally the economically dominant indi-
vidual in a household. A household is divided into two parts, the "pri-
mary economic unit" ("PEU") , which can be a group much larger 
than would be included on a tax return, and others ("non-PEU mem-
bers"). In general, PEU members include the core family in the 
household. Non-PEU members include boarders, servants, economi-
cally independent children living at home, and others. 
Respondents are asked for information including value about assets 
in many different categories. They are asked for basic demographic 
data, such as the ages of the head or heads of the household. They are 
asked for some tax information, including filing status (married, sin-
gle, filing separate returns) , and AGI (the item on a tax return that is 
likely to come closest to a relatively pure definition of income). They 
are not asked, however, for information about their taxable income or 
how much tax they pay. Detailed information is collected for those in 
the PEU; summary information is collected for those not in the PEU. 
The 1995 SCF reports information from 4,299 respondents. For 
each respondent, the survey reports the answers to approximately 
2,500 questions.l05 The actual interviews took from about five min-
104 The SCF is available on the Federal Reserve Board 's Web site at <http:// 
www.bog.frb.fed.us/pubs/oss/oss2/95/scf95home.html>. We use the term SCF both to refer 
to the actual survey and to refer to the office in the Federal Reserve Board that is responsi-
ble for the survey. The meaning should be clear from the context. The primary description 
of the survey, including the definition of all variables, is contained in Arthur Kennickel, 
Federal Reserve Board Codebook for 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances (Codebook), 
available at <http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/pubs/oss/oss2/95scf95home.html>. For further dis-
cussions of the methodology used in conducting the survey, see the papers available at 
<http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/pubs/oss/oss2/method.html>. 
105 The actual survey consists of more than 2,500 questions, but many answers are not on 
the public use data set because of privacy concerns. 
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utes to a little over nine hours. The average interview lasted about 
100 minutes. 106 
Of course, the accuracy of the information collected is subject to 
many questions. Problems range from sampling error to a respon-
dent's unwillingness to reveal sensitive private information, to re-
sponse bias. Many of the answers are missing. In the case of missing 
answers, answers are imputed based on the remaining answers. Obvi-
ously, the imputation process is another source of error. 107 
The SCF is designed to estimate the wealth holding of the entire 
U.S. population. In order to do so, the Federal Reserve Board esti-
mates a set of weights, one for each respondent. The weights add up 
to 99,010,458, the number of households in the United States in 1994. 
Thus, each observation is intended to represent a different number of 
households. The average weight is 23,031, with a range from 7 to 
69,337. The median weight is 25,504.1°8 The estimation of the weights 
introduces further errors into the process.l09 
Privacy concerns place further restrictions on the SCF. In order to 
get people to agree to be interviewed, the Federal Reserve Board 
promises strict confidentiality. In addition, the use of tax return data 
to select possible respondents introduces further restrictions on public 
release of the data. In order to assure confidentially, the Federal Re-
serve Board takes a number of steps, some of which are disclosed and 
some of which are not. Disclosed steps include deleting specified vari-
ables from the public-use data set, 110 switching answers between re-
spondents, changing answers, setting answers to missing, top- or 
106 See Variable X7398 (length of interview in seconds). 
107 In addition to introducing possible bias, the imputation process also means that con-
ventional estimates of standard errors are incorrect. To enable users to estimate standard 
errors, the SCF provides five estimates for each imputed value. Thus, the SCF dataset 
consists of five full sets of answers to each question. Each set is referred to as an implicate. 
For the work reported here, we generally have used only the first implicate. Use of only 
the first (or any other) implicate should provide unbiased estimates. 
108 See Variable X42000. 
109 In addition to adjusting standard errors for errors introduced by estimation of miss-
ing values (see note 107), it is necessary to adjust standard errors for the imprecision of the 
weights. Each implicate has its own set of estimated weights. In addition, the Federal 
Reserve Board provides an additional 999 replicate weights that can be used to further 
refine estimates of standard deviations. We do not report standard errors in this Article. 
no Examples of variables that are not in the public data set include whether the respon-
dent was chosen randomly or from the high-income sample, specific dates (such as the 
purchase date of a residence or the respondent's birth month), the make and model of 
automobiles, many sample design variables, and the location of residence. 
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bottom-coding variables ,111 and reducing the number of categories in 
an answer. 112 
O bviously, there are severe limitations to the data. Whatever its 
limitations, however, the SCF is acknowledged to be the best data set 
available for information on wealth holdings. Thus, we are unapo-
logetic about our decision to use it. On the other hand, it is importan t 
to keep its limitations in mind when evaluating our results. 
VI. DESIGN OF THE TAX 
As we discussed above, the basic structure of our wealth tax is a fiat 
tax on earned income combined with a fiat tax on net worth. A pure 
fiat tax is, however, unacceptable from an equitable point of view (and 
probably administratively as well). Any significant socially acceptable 
type of tax must provide some type of exemption. The exact form of 
an exemption is less certain. There are essentially two possible ex-
emption structures. One is an exemption that relates to a particular 
category of asset. The other is an exemption that applies to a tax re-
turn or to an individual. A realistic tax system is likely to combine 
both types. 113 
The easiest exemption to justify is one aimed at the individual's 
overall wealth (including earned income). Since the premise of the 
wealth tax is that wealth is a good measure of how well-off an individ-
ual is , presumably those with the least wealth are worst-off and, there-
fore, should benefit from an exemption. Thus, the exemption should 
be tied to individuals' wealth and not to the particular assets they pre-
fer to hold. Such an exemption is the equivalent of the personal ex-
emption and standard deduction in the current income tax, provisions 
that add significant progressivity to the income tax. 
An individual exemption presents a variety of design issues. The 
first is whether there should be separate exemptions for the wage and 
net worth portions of the tax or a single combined exemption. For 
111 For example, number of children not living with the responent is top-coded at 10. 
SCF, note 104, Variable X5910. The number of inheritances or substantial gifts is top-
coded at 5. Id. Variable X5801. 
112 For example, law degrees, medical degrees, and certain other doctorates are com-
bined into a single answer. ld. Variable X5905. Similarly, the practice of law is combined 
with, among other professions, barbers and parking lot operators. 
For a discussion of the steps taken to prevent disclosure and the implication of those 
procedures, see Arthur Kennickel, (Nov. 1997); G. Fries, B. Johnson, R.L. Woodburn, An-
alyzing the Disclosure Review Procedures for the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances, 
(Sept. 1997), Multiple Imputation and Disclosure Protection: The Case of the 1995 Survey 
of Consumer Finances, both available at <http://www.bog.frb.fed .us/pubs/oss/oss2/ 
method.html>. 
113 In a progressive tax structure, it is important whether an exemption is styled as a 
deduction or a tax credit. With a fiat tax rate the difference is not important. 
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example , it would be possible to exempt the first $5,000 of earned 
income and the first $40,000 of net worth. There seems to be no rea-
son, however, that someone with, for example, $5,500 in wages and no 
assets should be paying tax, while someone with $40,000 in assets and 
$5 ,000 in wages is entirely exempt. Rather, it would be fairer to inte-
grate the two exemptions. The easiest way to do so is through a uni-
fied tax credit that can be applied against the sum of the two taxes. 
The next step is to determine the filing unit and how the credit 
would be adjusted for family size. The approach we suggest provides 
for joint filing and a two-level exemption. A larger exemption is pro-
vided for one or two heads of household and a smaller exemption is 
provided for each member of the family. At this stage, our goal is to 
pick numbers that exempt many of the same wage-earning families as 
the income tax currently exempts. 114 The figures we use for our base 
case are a $1,500 credit for one or two heads of a household and a 
$400 credit for each member of the household (including the heads of 
household). 115 We use alternative figures to explore the effect of the 
exemption level on progressivity and tax rates. We treat the credit as 
nonrefundable. 
Table 5 compares the income and wealth tax imposed on low-in-
come taxpayers assuming the above-mentioned wealth tax credits and 
the personal exemption and the standard deduction in the income tax. 
For an individual or family earning $15,000 a year in salary and no 
substantial assets, and an assumed wealth tax rate of 18% on wages, 
the wealth tax is generally substantially less than the current income 
tax. For example, for a married couple with one child, the income tax 
liability would be $218 and the wealth tax liability would be zero. For 
a single parent with one child, the income tax liability would be $960 
and the wealth tax liability would be only $400. 
The joint return structure means that there might be a marriage bo-
nus, but could not be a marriage penalty.l 16 The marriage bonus 
arises when a person with precredit tax liability in excess of the credit 
ll4 We speak of wage-earning families because we are aware that our wealth tax would 
cause some retired families with low income but high wealth to be taxed. Also, we have 
not taken into account some welfare-like provisions of the current income tax , notably the 
earned income credit. 
115 Measured against the 15% rate bracket, the 1994 personal exemption of $2,450 was 
worth $367.50. The 1994 standard deduction for an individual was worth $570; for married 
filing jointly, it was worth $476.25 per person; for a head of household, it was worth $840. 
We use 1994 numbers because 1994 is the year for which we model our wealth tax. 
116 We speak in terms of married couples, but are not committed to any particular defi-
nition of couples eligible to file a joint return. The SCF includes both spouses and partners 
in the definition of the primary economic unit. Arthur B. Kennickell, Martha Starr-Mc-
Cluer & Anita E. Sunden, Family Finances in the U.S.: Evidence From the Survey of 
Consumer Finances, Federal Reserve Bull. 23 (Jan. 1997). 
548 TAX LAW REVIEW 
TABLE 5 
CoMPAR ISON OF I NCOME A.l~D WEALTH T.<L"X FOR Low 
INCOME TAXPAYERS 
Marital status 
Single 
Single 
Married 
Married 
Married 
Children 
0 
1 
0 
1 
2 
Incom e tax 
$1,320 
960 
578 
218 
0 
Taxpayers are assumed to have $15,000 in salary and no asse ts. 
Income tax is for 1994 and assumes the standard deduction. 
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Wealth tax 
$800 
400 
0 
0 
0 
Wealth tax assumes 18 % rate on wages, a credit of $1,500 per head of household, and 
a credit of $400 per person. 
marries someone with precredit tax liability less than the credit. 
Under the base case, the maximum marriage bonus is $1 ,900. 117 We 
do not propose a structure with a marriage bonus out of a belief that a 
bonus is a desirable attribute of a tax structure, but rather because the 
bonus flows from the progressive nature of the tax (through the ex-
emption) combined with the belief that joint filing is a useful adminis-
trative device (particularly with regard to net worth), a marriage 
bonus is preferable to a marriage penalty, and a marriage bonus at the 
level specified is not seriously objectionable.l18 
The wealth tax structure also raises issues of income and asset shift-
ing within the family. So far we have not focused on the issue of shift-
ing. Assuming that the wealth tax is like the current income tax 
where, in general, children are treated as separate taxpayers, there 
would be an incentive to shift some assets to a child's name. Given 
the limited size of the credit, and the flat rate once the credit is ex-
117 By contrast, under the income tax, the maximum marriage bonus was $6,540.72. The 
maximum marriage bonus was reached when a single person earning be tween $166,801 and 
$167,700 married an individual with no income. Over that range, the couple's standard 
deduction increased from $3,800 (single standard deduction) to $6,350 (joint standard de-
duction), and their personal exemptions increased from $1,323 (one exemption with 46% 
phased out) to $4,900 (two exemptions without phaseout). In addition, the married couple 
gets the advantage of expanded 15%, 28%, and 31% brackets. The estimate takes into 
account only the rate structure, personal exemptions (including phaseout), and the stan-
dard deduction. By taking into account losses or itemized deductions, the marriage bonus 
can be made indefinitely (and unrealistically) large. Figures for the income tax are for 
1994, the year for which we model the wealth tax. 
118 If it were desirable to lower the marriage bonus, it would be possible to provide a 
combined credit that is less than twice the individual credit. Such a change would be likely 
to create many more marriage penalties then it would reduce marriage bonuses. The only 
way to prevent either a marriage penalty or a marriage bonus is to require separate filing. 
Even then, separate filing requirements could be avoided easily by shifting assets between 
wife and husband, thus, in effect, reintroducing the marriage bonus de facto if not de jure. 
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ceeded, shifting to children does not appear to be a particularly im-
portant issue. It is possible that rules would have to be developed, 
like the rules in the current income tax, that restrict exemptions from 
being used on multiple returns.l19 Rules equivalent to the so-called 
kiddie tax would not be required because of the fiat rate.l20 
Exemptions for categories of assets are harder to justify than indi-
vidual exemptions. If the purpose of the exemption is to help people 
who are less well-off, it is generally more efficient to target such indi-
viduals directly by reference to their level of wealth, rather than indi-
rectly by reference to their choice of assets. Thus, for example, it may 
be that poor people are more likely to own mobile homes, and thus, 
one could target relief to poor people by exempting mobile homes, 
but such an approach is likely to be less effective than simply targeting 
poor people directly.l21 In addition to being an inferior means of 
targeting an exemption, exempting specific assets is often inefficient 
because it distorts an investor's choice of assets. For example, an ex-
emption for mobile homes would encourage people to live in mobile 
homes despite the fact that they would prefer to rent an apartment. 
Nevertheless, a realistic system is likely to exempt certain assets for 
a variety of reasons. First, it may be that while, in general, wealth is a 
good proxy for well-being, it is not a perfect proxy and can be im-
proved upon by using additional indicia. For example, the medical 
expense deduction often is justified on the ground that people in bad 
health have lower welfare than people in good health. An exemption 
under the wealth tax for, say, durable medical equipment could be 
justified on the same ground. 
Second, exemptions for assets can be supported to encourage their 
purchase. Exemptions for housing and for pension assets can be justi-
fied under this rubric.122 As indicated earlier, we do not think it likely 
that owner-occupied residences would be taxed like other assets and, 
for our base case, we have exempted net housing equity up to $1 mil-
lion.l23 We also assumed that pension reserves would be the subject 
of special treatment. In our base case, we exempt pension assets. Our 
119 See, e.g. , IRC § 62 (dependent standard deduction) , § 151 (denial of exemption to 
dependents). 
12o IRC § 1(g) (taxing children's income over a threshold amount at their parent's mar-
ginal rate). 
121 Sales taxes often exempt food and clothing as a means of making the tax less regres-
sive. In the context of sales taxes, a justification for exempting certain goods, rather than 
providing a taxpayer exemption is that absent a system of taxpayer returns, it is difficult to 
provide exemptions to individuals. 
122 Exempting assets to encourage their purchase is more in the nature of an efficiency 
than an equity rationale. 
123 IRC § III .G. 
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model leaves open the possibility that a tax at a rate less than 100% of 
the regular tax might apply to pension assets .124 
Finally, assets may be exempt for administrative reasons. In this 
regard, we assume an exemption for most consumer durables .125 As-
sets also may be exempt because they are too difficult to value. For 
example, some contingent tort claims may be considered too difficult 
to value. 
VII . REsULTs-WHAT A U.S . WEALTH TAx M IGHT L ooK LIKE 
In this Section, we use the SCF to compute aggregate figures for 
earned income and net worth. Using these figures and our figures for 
personal credits, we provide estimates of tax rates that would be suffi-
cient to replace either the personal income tax or both the personal 
and corporate income taxes in the United States. We then explore 
alternative ways to raise the same amount of revenue 
A . Net Worth and I ts Components 
The SCF collects information on net worth. Table 6 contains a list 
of major categories of assets and liabilities along with the household 
mean for each category and the estimated total for all households. 
Except for the last two lines of Table 6, all data in the table are for 
members of the primary economic unit only. Table 7 contains data for 
members of the household who are not members of the primary eco-
nomic unit. The data from Table 7 is summarized in the penultimate 
row of Table 6 and is included in the total net worth figure in the last 
row of Table 6. 
Total net worth is estimated to be $19 trillion, of which only .95% is 
from non-PEU members. Putting aside non-PEU members, gross as-
sets are about $22.8 trillion and liabilities are about $3.9 trillion for net 
worth of $18.8 trillion. 126 
As can be seen from Table 6, financial assets are $6.7 trillion, about 
29% of gross assets. The remaining 71% of gross assets consists of 
nonfinancial assets, the most important categories of which are pri-
124 At present, our estimate of pension assets, particularly in defined benefit plans, is 
quite weak. In future research, we intend to use sources from outside the SCF to estimate 
total reserves and use the information in the SCF to allocate aggregate resources among 
participants. 
125 See Subsection III.D. for a fuller discussion of the treatment of consumer durables. 
126 Our definition of net worth is generally the same as that used by the SCF with two 
exceptions. First, the SCF includes certain types of liquid retirement accounts, including 
IRAs, Keoghs, and other retirement plans with cash values. The estimate in Table 6 in-
cludes no retirement wealth. Second, the SCF, apparently for historical reasons. includes 
bonds at face value. We include bonds at fair market value. 
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TABLE 6 
NET WoRTH DATA - PRIMARY EcoNOMIC UNITS 
Percent of gross 
Total assets or 
Description Mean (billions) liabilities 
Assets 
Financial Asse ts 
Liquid Accounts (checking, savings) , 
Money market and call accounts) $13,261 $1,313 5.8 
Certificates of deposit 5,094 504 2.2 
Mutual funds other than money market) 11,733 1,162 5.1 
Stocks 14,081 1,394 6.1 
Bonds (other than savings bonds) 6,427 636 2.8 
Savings bonds 1,208 120 0.5 
Cash value of life insurance 6,582 652 2.9 
Other managed assets 5,821 576 2.5 
Other financial assets 2,991 296 1.3 
Total Financial Assets 67,198 6,653 29.2 
Nonfinancial Assets 
Vehicles 11,283 1,117 4.9 
Primary residences 74,845 7,410 32.5 
Investment real estate 28,238 2,796 12.3 
Business interests 44,782 4,434 19.5 
Other nonfinancial assets 3,701 366 1.6 
Total Nonfinancial Assets 162,850 16,124 70.8 
Total Assets 230,048 22,777 100.0 
Liabilities 
Mortgages (including home equity loans) 26,891 2,662 67.4 
Other lines of credit 219 22 0.5 
Other real estate debt 6,020 596 15.1 
Credit card balances 1,428 141 3.6 
Installment debt 4,407 436 11.1 
Other debt 917 91 2.3 
Total Debt 39,882 3,949 100.0 
Net worth 
Assets-liabilities from PEU 190,166 18,828 
Net worth of non-PEU members 13,008 181 
Total net worth 19,009 
Source: SCF-Authors' computations 
Except as indicated, includes assets and liabilities from primary economic units only. 
Mean is computed per household, not pe r individual. 
mary residences ($7.4 trillion, 32.5% ), business interests ($4.4 trillion, 
19.5% ), and investment real estate ($2.8 trillion, 12% ). 
The primary category of liabilities is home mortgages (and home 
equity lines of credit), which total $2.7 billion or 67% of liabilities. 
Other real estate debt totals $0.6 trillion (15%) and installment debt is 
$0.4 trillion (11% ). 
The figures for net worth do not include any estimates of retirement 
wealth. Our preliminary estimate of retirement wealth based on the 
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TABLE 7 
NET WoRTH DATA - NoN-PEU ME:rviBERS 
Description 
Assets 
Bank accounts and savings bonds 
Primary residences 
Vehicles 
Other assets 
Total assets 
Liabilities 
Mortgages 
Other debts 
Total debts 
Net worth 
Assets-Liabilities 
Source: SCF - Authors' computations 
Mean* 
$2,581 
1,404 
5,238 
7,665 
16,888 
235 
3,645 
3,880 
$13,008 
Includes only people not part of a primary economic unit. 
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Total 
(billions) 
$ 36 
20 
73 
107 
235 
3 
51 
54 
$181 
* Mean is per household, including the assets and liabilities of all members of the 
household who are not members of the primary economic unit. 
SCF is $3 trillion. We know this figure to be too low.127 By contrast, 
the flow of funds estimate for pension fund reserves is $4.9 trillion.128 
B. Wages and Other Earned Income 
Data on wages and other forms of earned income are included in 
Table 8. The first part of the table contains information on members 
of the primary economic unit and the second part has information on 
those who are not members of the primary economic unit. In the ag-
gregate, members of the primary economic unit have earned income 
of $4.1 trillion. Nonmembers have aggregate earned income of $172 
billion, approximately 4% of total earned income. 
Wages and salaries represent 79% of earned income among mem-
bers of the primary economic unit. Business and profession income 
and pension income each represents approximately 10% of earned in-
come. Among individuals that are not part of the primary economic 
unit, the percentage of income from pensions goes up to 13% and the 
percentage from business and professional sources drops to 2.5%. 
Wage and salary income takes up the slack, increasing to 84%. 
127 Our current estimate includes IRAs, Keoghs, defined contribution plans, and esti-
mates of the present value of future retirement benefits from defined benefit plans for 
those who are currently employed. Our estimate does not include the value of retirement 
benefits from defined benefit plans in current pay status. Obviously, so far we have failed 
to include a substantial source of retirement wealth. 
12s See Table 2, on page 527. 
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TABLE 8 
EARNED INCOME DATA 
Description 
Earned Income of PEU Members 
Wages and salaries 
Business and professional income 
Unemployment compensation 
Alimony receipts 
Welfare 
Pension income 
Other income 
Alimony payments 
Total Income-PEU 
Earned Income of non-PEU members 
Wage and salary income 
Pension and social security income 
Business and professional income 
Total Income-Non-PEU members 
Total Earned Income of all people 
Source: Authors' computations 
Mean 
$33,028 
4,123 
170 
205 
351 
4,092 
82 
(312) 
$41,739 
$10,414 
2,939 
306 
$13,659 
Mean is computed per household , not per individual. 
* Total does not sum due to rounding 
C. Household Data 
Total 
(billions) 
$3,270 
408 
17 
20 
35 
405 
8 
(31) 
$4,133 
$145 
41 
4 
$190* 
$4,322* 
553 
Percent of 
income 
79.1 
9.9 
0.4 
0.5 
0.8 
9.8 
0.2 
-0.7 
100.0 
84.4 
13.1 
2.5 
100.0 
Tables 9-11 contain data on household structure. The basic unit 
used by the SCF is the PEU. The SCF defines a PEU as "an economi-
cally dominant single individual or couple (married or living as part-
ners) in a household and all other individuals in the household who 
are financially dependent on that individual or couple. "129 For the 
most part, we adopted the SCF's household structure. 
Table 9 indicates that there are 99 million households or PEUs. Of 
these, 41 million have a single head of household and 58 million have 
two heads of household.l30 We consider a family to be all members of 
the PEU. Families in the SCF dataset have from one to nine members 
(including the head or heads). The average family size is 2.4 people. 
In addition to the PEUs, we have minimal information on other 
people living in the household who are not members of the PEU. Ta-
ble 10 summarizes the non-PEU members. There are 13.9 million 
households that have members who are not members of the PEU. 
As shown in Table 10, in 74% of the cases, or 10.3 million house-
holds, there is only a single non-PEU member and, a fortiori, only one 
head of household. With respect to the 3.6 million households with 
more than one non-PEU member, we have not been able to deter-
129 See Codebook, note 104. 
130 That is, a household is considered to have two heads if the economically dominant 
individual has a spouse or partner. 
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TABLE 9 
DEMOGR~Pmcs-PRIIVL~RY EcoNOMIC UNITS 
Distribution of Head of Households 
Number of head of households 
Households with single head 
Households with two heads 
Total Households 
Number of head of households 
Number of people in PEU 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Total households 
Total number of people 
Average number per family 
Number of households 
41,107,561 
57,902,897 
99,010,458 
156,913,355 
Family Size 
Number of households 
30,097,718 
33,594,316 
14,141,795 
13,150,212 
5,145,853 
2,065,094 
480,849 
268,955 
65,665 
99,010,458 
236,540,986 
2.39 
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Percem 
42 
58 
100 
Percent 
30.4 
33.9 
14.3 
13.3 
5.2 
2.1 
0.5 
0.3 
0.1 
100.0 
mine the family structure of the non-PEU members. In the absence of 
such information, we arbitrarily decided that if there are additional 
non-PEU members, they consist of a family with two heads. There is, 
in general, no reason to believe that our assumption is true. To the 
contrary, it might well be equally valid to assume that all non-PEU 
members were independent individuals. Nevertheless, for the time 
being, we report our results under the assumption that all non-PEU 
members within a household constitute a single family. Under these 
assumptions, there are a total of 17.5 million heads of household and 
an average family size of 1.35 persons. 
Given the information that we have on family structure and given 
the credit that we adopt of $1,500 per head of household and $400 per 
family member (including heads), we can estimate the maximum cred-
its permitted under the wealth tax. The estimate is a maximum be-
cause it assumes that all credits are fully utilized. Given that the 
credits are nonrefundable, not all credits would be utilized.131 As 
shown in Table 11, based on 255 million people and 174 million heads 
of households, the maximum credit would be $364 billion. Given that 
the combined personal and corporate income taxes collect $676 bil-
lion, the potential credit cost is substantial. 
131 When we estimate taxes, below, we provide an estimate of credits actually used. 
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TABLE 10 
555 
D EMOGRAPHICS-PEOPLE NOT MEMBE RS OF P RIMARY ECONOMIC UNITS 
Distribution of Head of Households 
Num ber of head of households 
Households with single head 
Households with two heads 
Total households 
Number of head of households 
Households w/o non-PEU 
members 
Number of households 
10,254,871 
3,644,080 
13,898,951 
17,543,030 
85,111 ,507 
Family size 
Percent 
74 
26 
100 
Percent of 
non-PEU 
Number of people not in PEU Number of households households 
0 85,11 1,507 
1 10,254,871 
2 2,623,929 
3 880,753 
4 110,369 
5 29,029 
Total Households with non-
PEU members 13,898,951 
Total number of people 18,73 1,609 
Average number per 
household (with one or more) 1.35 
TABLE ll 
DEMOGRAPHICS - CREDITS 
Number of people living in PEUs 
Number of people not living in PEUs 
Total number of people 
Number of head of households in PEUs 
Number of head of households 's not living in 
PEUs 
Total number of head of households 
236,540,986 
18,731,609 
255 ,272,594 
156,913,355 
17,543,030 
174,456,385 
73.8 
18.9 
6.3 
0.8 
0.2 
100.0 
Credit type A mount of credit 
$1,500 
Number of credits 
(millions) 
Head of household 
Family member 
Total 
400 
174 
255 
Total credit cost assumes all credits usable against tax liability. 
D. Base Case Tax 
Percent of all 
households 
86.0 
10.4 
2.7 
0.9 
0.1 
0.0 
14.0 
Total credit cost 
(billions) 
$262 
102 
$364 
Based on the above, we would like to provide an estimate of the tax 
rates for a wealth tax that would be necessary to raise sufficient reve-
nue to replace the personal and corporate income taxes. Unfortu-
nately, we still have not fully specified the tax. Since the wealth tax 
has two parameters, the tax rate on net worth and the tax rate on 
waaes there is an infinite number of combinations of these two rates 
b ' 
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that would raise the requisite revenue. Table 12 shows combinations 
of rates for the wealth tax that would raise sufficient revenue to re-
place either the individual income tax or both the individual and cor-
porate income taxes. 
TABLE 12 
CoMBINATIONS oF WAGE TAX AND NET WoRTH TAx RATES 
Net Worth Rate to Replace 
Wage Tax Rate 
0.00 
1.00 
2.00 
3.00 
4.00 
6.00 
6.00 
7.00 
8.00 
9.00 
10.00 
11.00 
12.00 
13.00 
14.00 
15.00 
16.00 
17.00 
18.00 
19.00 
20.00 
21.00 
22.00 
23.00 
24.00 
25.00 
Individual and Corporate Taxes 
5.7 
5.6 
5.4 
5.2 
5.0 
4.8 
4.6 
4.4 
4.2 
3.9 
3.7 
3.4 
3.1 
2.9 
2.6 
2.3 
2.0 
1.8 
1.5 
1.2 
0.9 
0.6 
0.3 
0.0 
-0.4 
-0.9 
Individual Tax Only 
4.7 
4.5 
4.4 
4.2 
4.0 
3.8 
3.6 
3.4 
3.2 
2.9 
2.7 
2.4 
2.2 
1.9 
1.6 
1.3 
1.1 
0.8 
0.5 
0.2 
-0.1 
-0.6 
-1.2 
-1.8 
-2.6 
-3.5 
For example, if the wage tax rate were set at 18%, in order to re-
place both taxes, the rate on net worth would have to be 1.5%. If only 
the individual tax were to be replaced, the rate on net worth would 
need to be only .5%. At the extremes, if there were no wage tax, the 
net worth rate would have to be 5.7% to replace both taxes (4.7% for 
individual only), and if there were no net worth tax, the wage tax rate 
would have to be 23% for both taxes (19.6% for individual only). 
Figure 4 provides in a graphical format the same information as in 
Table 12. 
FIGURE 4 
COMBINATIONS OF NET WOHTH AND AND WAGE TAX RATES NECESSAHY TO HEP LACE TAXES SHOWN (ISO-REVENUE LlNES) 
Q) 
ro 
a: 
~ 
.c 
t:: 
~ 
Q) 
z 
6% ,-- ---- -------------------------------· -··-·····----
~Individual and corporate income taxes 
5% .j -----1 
4o/o · 1--------------~~~--------------~~----------------------------------------------------------------~ 
3% - ----J 
Individual income tax only 
2%i--------------·------------------------~~~----~~~------------------------_j 
1% T-------------------------------------------------------~----------~----------------~ 
Oo/o +---------------------r-------------------~r-------------------~------------------~-r----------~~------~ 
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 
Wage Tax Rate 
N 
0 
0 
0 ..__, 
>-
() 
0 
~ 
'\:1 
?:l 
t'Ti 
;r: 
t'Ti z 
(/) 
< 
t'Ti 
< 
t'Ti 
>-
tj 
::r: ,.., 
? 
>< 
ll1 
Ul 
.......:J 
558 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53: 
The lines shown on the graph are iso-revenue lines; each point on a 
line would raise the same overall wealth tax. 132 In particular, for any 
revenue target R, wage base W, and net worth base NW, the relation-
ship between the tax rate on net worth TNw and the tax rate on wages 
Tw would satisfy the following equation: 
tNW = 
R 
mv 
w 
x tw 
NW 
It is the presence of nonrefundable credits that causes the iso-reve-
nues to be convex. As tax rates move to the extreme points, more 
people are in an excess credit position, thus permitting a revenue tar-
get to be reached with lower tax rates. For example, assume that 
there were only two individuals, one with lots of net worth and the 
other with lots of wages. As long as both tax rates are sufficiently 
large, both individuals would be taxable and, hence, both individuals 
would be able to utilize their respective credits. If, however, only net 
worth (or wages) were taxable, only the individual with net worth 
(wages) would be taxable and eligible to use her credit. Thus, at the 
extremes, the use of credits would fall by one-half. 
At this stage in our research, we have not settled on a unique com-
bination of net worth and wage tax rates to recommend. Neverthe-
less, we feel it is useful to suggest a reasonable pair of rates that can 
be used as our base case. For this purpose, we settled on the require-
ment that the wealth tax raise approximately the same amount from 
both capital and labor as do the taxes being replaced. We do not have 
a strong justification for this requirement, but feel that it is a reason-
able starting point. 
We note that one of the clear advantages of a consumption tax over 
the income tax is that the consumption tax generally does not burden 
savings, while the income tax does. 133 Like the income tax, the wealth 
tax places a burden on savings. What is relevant from an efficiency 
point of view is the relative marginal burdens of the wealth tax versus 
the income tax on capital. Our requirement that the two taxes raise 
the same revenue from capital, therefore, does not guarantee that 
they have the same efficiency cost. Nevertheless, given that the 
wealth tax burdens capital more uniformly than does the income tax, 
we suspect, but are not able to prove, that so long as the aggregate tax 
burden on capital under the wealth tax is no greater than the aggre-
gate tax burden on capital under the income tax, the efficiency loss 
132 The iso-revenue lines are convex to the origin (that is, they are bowed out away from 
the origin). If there were no credits , the iso-revenue lines would be straight lines. 
133 See the discussion of taxes on capital in Subsection II.B. 
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under the wealth tax will be no greater than the efficiency loss under 
the income tax. 
Another advantage in setting the base case so that the proportion of 
the wealth tax that falls on capital is the same as for the income tax is 
that it makes the two taxes more nearly comparable. V.-/e would like to 
determine whether the progressivity of the wealth tax (as measured 
against AGI) comes from a more uniform taxation of capital, or 
whether it comes from a heavier average taxation of capital. By link-
ing the wealth tax to the income tax in this way, we are more confi-
dent that the progressivity we measure does not come from a heavier 
average taxation of capital. 
To determine the burden the current income tax imposes on capital 
(as opposed to labor), we look separately at the individual and corpo-
rate income taxes. For the individual income tax, we base our calcula-
tions on summary statistics of the income of taxpayers and the taxes 
they paid for 1994134 , the year about which the SCF panel was ques-
tioned, rather than a more elaborate model based on data for a sam-
ple of representative individuals. We then make some simplifying 
assumptions to calculate the tax's burden on labor. Since our data is 
summarized by the AGI of taxpayers, we first assume that taxpayers 
in a single AGI class have the same tax profile-specifically, that they 
pay tax at the same rate. This assumption is obviously inaccurate, but 
we think the classes are narrow enough that the assumption does not 
seriously distort our results. We then try to determine what percent-
age of the AGI of taxpayers in each class can be considered income 
from labor. This obviously includes wages. We also include all in-
come from sole proprietorships, including professional practices. (We 
treat income from businesses and professional practices reported in 
the SCF as wages for purposes of our analyses.) In fact, income from 
some businesses and professional practices includes a component de-
rived from the capital invested in the enterprise. In the case of in-
come from partnerships (or S corporations), the SOI data shows that, 
of about $107 billion135 net income (less deficit) of partnerships in 
1995, over $37 billion came from services. 136 For our initial analyses, 
we ascribe 75% of income from partnerships and S corporations to 
wages. Using these figures, we determine a percentage of AGI de-
rived from labor. 
An influential model by Arnold Harberger argues that the corpo-
rate income tax is a uniform burden on all capital, not just capital 
134 Statistics of Income, note 99. 
m $178.7 billion net income, less deficit of $71.8 billion. 
136 $49.6 billion of net income, less $12.1 billion deficit. This data comes from Timothy 
Wheeler. IRS, Statistics of Incom e 1995: Partnership Returns 43, 54-66 tbl.l (1997) . 
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invested in corporate form. 137 Some would restrict the burden of the 
corporate tax to capital invested in corporate form. 138 That issue does 
not affect our analysis, which is concerned solely with the question of 
whether capital or labor is burdened. Attacks that are more serious 
for our purpose come from those who argue that the corporate tax can 
be shifted to labor. 139 These analyses would shift part of the burden 
of the corporate tax away from capital. In an important work, Joseph 
Pechman summarizes various opinions on the incidence of the corpo-
rate tax.140 Under most views, all of the corporate tax burdens capi-
tal.141 Under some alternatives, however, as much as one-half of the 
tax is shifted away from capital. 142 For purposes of our initial analysis, 
we assume that 75% of the corporate tax is a burden on capital.143 
With the assumptions above, we find that the total burden of the two 
income taxes falls on capital to the extent of 28% and on labor to the 
extent of 72%. 
If we constrain the wealth tax so that the wage portion raises 72% 
of the revenue, we have a unique solution. We find that we can raise 
the amount raised by the individual and corporate income taxes with 
tax rates of 17.7% on wages and 1.57% on net worth. We refer to this 
combination of rates as the base case. 
If we sought only to replace the individual income tax, the relative 
amounts of tax on labor and capital would change. We estimate that 
approximately 84% of the personal income tax falls on labor. Using 
that constraint, we find that we could raise sufficient revenue to re-
137 Arnold C. Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. Pol. Econ. 
215 (1962). 
138 Joseph A. Pechman, Who Paid the Taxes, 1966-85, at 32 (1985). 
139 See, e.g., Harvey S. Rosen, Public Finance 436 (4th ed. 1995); Richard A. Musgrave 
& Peggy G. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice 387-89 (5th ed. 1989); see 
also Anthony B. Atkinson & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Lectures on Public Economics 178 (1980) 
("The Harberger analysis provides considerable insight into the different factors at work, 
but it is premature to draw the firm conclusion ... " that capital bears at least the full 
burden of the corporate income tax.) 
140 Pechman, note 138. 
141 Id. at 35-37. 
142 Id. 
143 The CBO has used " three corporate tax incidence variations in recent years, some-
times treating the tax as borne by owners of capital, sometimes treating the tax as borne by 
labor ... and sometimes allocating the tax half to labor and half to capital." Michael J. 
Graetz, Paint-By-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 609, 642 (1995). Jeffrey 
Kwall argues that because "stock ownership tends to be concentrated among high-income 
individuals ," those individuals with higher incomes tend to bear the incidence of the corpo-
rate tax. Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Uncertain Case Against the Double Taxation of Corporate 
Income, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 613, 635 (1990) (citing ALI, Federal Income Tax Project, Sub-
chapter C, Proposals on Corporate Acquisitions and Dispositions and Reporter's Study on 
Corporate Distributions 328 (1982) , Joint Comm. on Tax'n, Federal Income Tax Aspects of 
Corporate Financial Structures 57 (1989)) . 
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place the personal income tax with tax rates of 17.1% on wages and 
.75% on net worth. 
E. Alternative Designs of the Wealth Tax 
In this Subsection, we examine how rates would change under vari-
ous alternatives to the base case. We examine the effects of altering 
the net worth base and changing the level of the exemptions. For pur-
poses of this Subsection, we assume that the wealth tax would replace 
both the personal and corporate income taxes. Except as otherwise 
indicated, we also assume that the wage portion of the tax would raise 
72% of the revenue. All of the rates discussed below are shown in 
Table 13. 
TABLE 13 
TAX RATES UNDER ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS 
Description of Base 
Base case 
Full inclusion of housing 
Same - keep net worth tax at base rate 
Exclude housing, permit deduction for mortgages 
Same - keep net worth tax at base rate 
Include retirement assets 
Same - keep net worth tax at base rate 
Include retirement and housing 
Same - keep net worth tax at base rate 
Reduce credits by 50% 
Double credits 
Wage tax only 
Net worth tax only 
1. Housing 
Net worth rate 
1.57 
1.26 
1.57 
1.71 
1.57 
1.12 
1.57 
0.96 
1.57 
1.44 
1.75 
0.00 
5.70 
Wage rate 
17.7 
17.4 
16.0 
17.8 
18.2 
17.8 
15.7 
17.6 
14.0 
14.5 
22.8 
23.0 
0.0 
Under the base case, we excluded net housing equity up to $1 mil-
lion. We also estimated tax rates under two alternative scenarios. In 
the first, we assume that housing is fully taxable. That is, we fully 
include both housing assets and mortgages in the tax base. In the sec-
ond, we assume that housing is exempt but permit mortgages up to $1 
million to be included in the tax base (that is, to reduce net worth).l44 
In the base case, $4.7 trillion of net housing is excluded.l45 Thus, if 
housing is fully included, the asset base increases by $4.7 trillion and 
144 Recall that exempting houses and deducting mortgages is essentially the same treat-
ment as under the current income tax. 
145 Figures for housing do not properly take into account the non-PEU individuals. It is 
unlikely that the results will change significantly when they are taken into account. 
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tax rates drop to 17.4% on wages and 1.26% on net worth. 146 If hous-
ing assets are exempt, but housing liabilities were included, the 
amount of the housing exemption would increase to $7.4 trillion and 
rates would increase to 17.8% on wages and 1.71% on housing. Thus, 
the treatment of housing has a significant effect on the necessary tax 
rates. Finally, if we freeze the tax rate on net worth to the base case 
rate of 1.57%, the rate on wages would fall to 16% in the no-housing-
exclusion case and would rise to 18.2% in the housing-excluded/mort-
gages-included case. 
2. Retirement 
We would like to estimate the effect of including retirement wealth 
in the tax base as we make our other estimates. Currently, however, 
our data on retirement wealth is insufficient at the household level to 
make such an estimation. We are able to get a rough idea of the effect 
of excluding retirement wealth by assuming that there is a separate tax 
on retirement wealth at the same rate as the net worth tax and that no 
credits are allowed against the retirement tax. As discussed above, 
our estimate of retirement wealth based on the SCF is $3 trillion. The 
estimate for pension fund reserves in the Flow of Funds accounts is 
$4.88 trillion. The Flow of Funds estimate, however, does not include 
amounts in IRAs or Keoghs. According to the SCF, there is $1.22 
trillion in IRAs and Keoghs. Thus, overall, our best estimate of retire-
ment assets is $5.10 trillion, the sum of the Flow of Funds figure and 
the SCF figure for IRAs and Keoghs. 
At the base case rate of 1.57%, a tax on retirement wealth would 
raise $80 billion. If rates on net worth were held constant, the rate on 
wages could decrease from 17.7% to 15.7%. If we maintained the 
capital/labor constraint, the rates would be 17.8% on wages and 
1.12% on net worth, including retirement wealth. 
Finally, if both retirement wealth and housing were included, tax 
rates would drop to 17.6% on wages and 0.96% on net worth. Alter-
natively, if we froze the net worth tax at 1.57%, the wage tax could fall 
to 14.0%. 
146 The scrupulous reader may be puzzled that an increase in an item included in the 
worth base should cause the tax rate on wages to decrease. The reason is that an increase 
in any part of the base causes some previously untaxed people to become taxpayers. To 
the extent they have wages, a portion of their wages is treated as taxed. Thus, an increase 
in an item that is included solely in net worth causes the base for both parts of the wealth 
tax to increase, reducing the tax rates required. In a wealth tax with no credit, this would 
not occur. 
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3 . Sensitivity of Rates to Credit Level 
As discussed above, the base case includes two personal nonrefund-
able tax credits, a $1,500 credit per head of household and an addi-
tional per person tax credit of $400. To test the effect of the level of 
the credit on tax rates , we compute rates under two alternative 
scenanos. 
Under the low-credit scenario, we decrease both credits by 50% to 
$750 and $200 for the head of household and per person credits, re-
spectively. Tax rates decrease to 1.44% on net worth and 14.5% on 
wages. Under the high-credit scenario, we double the credits to 
$3 ,000 and $800. Tax rates increase to 1.75% on net worth and 22.8% 
on wages. 
Under the base case, the potential amount of credits is $364 bil-
lion.l47 Of these potential credits, taxpayers are able to use credits of 
only $311 billion. Under the low-credit scenario, credits used would 
decrease to $242 billion. Under the high-credit scenario, credits used 
would increase to $378 billion. 
VIII. DISTRIBUTION OF THE WEALTH TAX 
We argued above that under the income tax, large amounts of in-
come from capital are either untaxed or taxed at much reduced effec-
tive rates and that as a result, it was possible to replace the income tax 
with a flat wealth tax and achieve much of the progressivity of the 
income tax. In this Section, we test that hypothesis. 
A central question in distributional analysis is the classification of 
the taxpaying population. If one felt that economic income was the 
best indicator of the well-being of a taxpayer, the appropriate ques-
tion would be how the burdens of alternative tax systems are distrib-
uted among various income groups. On the other hand , if wealth is 
really the best indicator of well-being, distribution should be made on 
the basis of wealth classes. For that matter, if consumption were the 
best indicator, distribution should be made based on consumption.148 
Defining the variable is an equally daunting task. Thus, for exam-
ple , if one were to use wealth as a classification variable, it would be 
necessary to define what was meant by wealth. The most serious diffi-
culty in defining wealth would be in determining how to treat human 
capital. 
We have not resolved the question of the best classifying variable. 
Fortunately, in order to answer the question that we posed, we do not 
need to determine the best classifier. We posited that much of the 
147 See Table 11 on page 555. 
148 The SCF generally does not have data on consumption . 
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progressiVIty of the income tax can be replicated by a single rate 
wealth tax. Thus, the task we set for ourselves is best accomplished by 
using the same classifying variable as one would use for an income 
tax. 149 The progressivity of the income tax conventionally is measured 
using some form of income as the classifying variable. Accordingly, 
we have chosen to compare the progressivity of the income tax as 
measured against income to the progressivity of the wealth tax also as 
measured against income. 
Next, we need to define income. For now, we have chosen AGI as 
our classifying measure. We are aware that extended measures of in-
come frequently are used and are believed to be superior to AGI as 
classifying variables.l50 Our primary reason for choosing AGI is the 
constraints imposed by our data. Moreover, we believe that AGI is a 
reasonable measure, although it is clearly not perfect. We hope to 
refine our classifying variable in future work.1 51 
As long as we intend the wealth tax to replace the corporate, as well 
as the personal income tax, we need to find a way to incorporate the 
corporate tax into our comparative distributions. As mentioned ear-
lier, it has been argued that the corporate income tax is a burden on 
all investments in capital.152 To compare the distribution of the 
wealth tax to the distribution of the combination of the personal and 
corporate income taxes, we allocate the latter to classes of individuals 
based on the relative net worth of individuals in each class.l53 
The data on income tax payments by AGI class comes from the IRS 
SOl publications. We compute the wealth tax using the SCF data 
under our base case, a 1.57% flat net worth tax combined with 17.7% 
wage tax. Credits allowed are $1,500 for heads of household and $400 
for each household member. We distribute that tax according to the 
AGI figures reported in the SCF. 
149 We understand that the fact that people measure the progressivity of the income tax 
by reference to income does not, in any sense, mean it is the best measure. Even, however, 
if we were able to determine the perfect classifier, we still would need to decide the correct 
level of progressivity given that classifier. Both determinations would require a far more 
elaborate model than we develop here. 
150 Treasury, the Joint Committee on Taxation, and the Congressional Budget Office 
each use somewhat different measures of income as classifiers. 
151 For example, the SCF contains data on tax-exempt bond holdings. Thus, we could 
impute exempt interest. Similarly, we could impute income on certain forms of retirement 
assets and on housing. If we wished to compare the distribution of the income tax and the 
distribution of the wealth tax, we also would need either to impute income tax figures to 
the SCF households, or otherwise to distribute income taxes paid by our chosen classifier. 
152 Harberger, note 137. 
153 We are aware that our method of allocating the corporate tax here is different from 
the method we used earlier. We intend to resolve this inconsistency in future research. 
2000] A COMPREHENSIVE WE ALTH TAX 565 
As with most data in the SCF, the AGI figure in the SCF is self-
reported and unverified.154 Moreover, while in some cases, the AGI 
refers to a figure on an already filed tax return , in other cases, it refers 
to a figure on a return that is expected to be fil ed. 155 We have, how-
ever, no reason to believe that there is a systematic bias in the report-
ing of AG I. 
There are additional problems with our analysis. First, the SCF is 
based on responses with respect to PEUs. By contrast, IRS data is 
based on the filing of tax returns. A PE U can file more than one tax 
return. Thus , for example, if a couple reports AGI of $100,000, we 
classify them as a single taxpayer with AGI of $100,000. In fact, how-
ever, they may have filed two returns, one with , say, $80,000 of AGI, 
and the other with $20,000 of AGI. The SOI data would classify them 
according! y. 
We have some ability to split the SCF data into two separate re-
turns. For example, where the PEU is headed by a couple (whether or 
not married), the SCF asks respondents whether they filed joint or 
individual tax returns.l5 6 Where more than one tax return was filed 
by the couple, we have tried to construct two separate wealth tax re-
turns for the PEU. We have not used these separate returns, however, 
in the distributional analysis that follows.l 57 We also have not at-
tempted to create additional wealth tax returns for other members of 
the PEU, such as children. 
A further problem concerns the non-PEU members. They are 
about 19 million individuals, not a trivial group.l58 The sketchy infor-
mation we have shows that they have assets of $181 billion and earned 
income of $172 billion.15Q PEUs consist of 237 million individuals,160 
with net assets of $19 trillion and earned income of $4 trillion.l61 
Thus, non-PEU individuals are about 7% of the population, with 1% 
of all assets and 4% of all earned income. Non-PEU members would 
pay wealth tax of $14 billion in the base case, about 2% of the tax. 
154 Adjusted gross income is reported in Variables X5751, X7651 , and X7652 Uoint re-
turn, separate return for head of household, separate return for spouse/partner, respec-
tively). SCF, note 104. 
155 Id. Variable X5744. 
156 The filing of joint returns in the data does not always correspond with marital status. 
In some cases SCF respondents report themselves as being not married, but filing joint 
returns. 
157 The information on separate filing is used to compare the number of filing units in 
the SCF data set to the number of filing units reported by SOL See Figure 16, Appendix. 
158 See Table 10 on page 555, and text following note 130. 
159 See Table 7 (assets) , on page 552, and Table 8 (earned income) , on page 553. 
160 See Table 7, on page 552. 
161 See Table 6 (assets), on page 551 , and Table 8 (earned income) , on page 553. 
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Unfortuna tely, we have no data on their AGI. 162 Accordingly, \ve had 
to estimate ;\.G I for non-PEU members. In order to do so , \Ve ha ve 
assumed that their AGI is equal to their wage income plus any income 
that is identified as being within certain categories that are li kely to 
form part of AGI.1 63 Although we would like to be able to refine our 
measure of AGI, we do not believe that any refinement would have a 
significant effect on the analysis. Moreover, since non-PEU members 
generally have low income and assets, any refinement would be likely 
to have an effect only in the lower AGI categories. 
A final point is that the IRS data has no information on th ose who 
do not file tax returns. The SCF includes about 20 million nonfilers. 164 
A . Distributional Results 
The graph in Figure 5 shows the distribution of the wealth tax by 
AGI class.165 Also included on the graph is the distribution of the 
personal income tax and the combination of the personal and corpo-
rate income taxes. 
The main finding is that, from $15,000 to $500,000 of AGI, our fla t 
rate wealth tax comes close to reproducing the progressivity of the 
current income tax, which has explicitly progressive rates. Below 
$15 ,000 of AGI (the "low income range"), the wealth tax is signifi-
cantly more burdensome than the income tax. We are neither sur-
prised nor disturbed by the level of wealth tax in the low income 
range. To begin with, it is important to identify low income individu-
als who would not be taxed more heavily under the wealth tax. As 
can be seen from Table 5,166 those with earned income under $15,000 
and no (or small amounts) of taxable wealth are taxed more lightly 
under the wealth tax than under the income tax. Table 5 shows both 
the income tax liability and the wealth tax liability for taxpayers with 
certain combinations of marital status and number of children. The 
162 In addition. as discussed above, where there are multiple non-PEU members in a 
household, we have no ability to separate them into filing uni ts. Accordingly, we assumed 
that all non-PEU members in a single household consist of a single fi ling unit 
163 For non-PEU members, the SCF has only two income variables: wages (X6403) and 
a composite vari able of income from other sources (X6415 ) ("other income"). SCF. note 
104. The SCF also has a series of variables that indicates whether other income includes 
particular types of income. We have included other income in AGI where it incl udes pen-
sions, interest, dividends, business income, real estate income, or unemployment compen-
sa tion. In such cases, however, other income also may include other types of income th at 
should not be included in AGI. 
164 There were 137 million fil ers in the SCF , about 87% of all heads of households being 
fi lers . Id. Note that we have no data on tax returns filed by non-PEU members. 
165 Additional perspective on Figure 5 can be gained by looking at Figures 15 and 17 in 
the Appendix, which show aggregate wealth tax and aggregate AGI by AGI ca tegory. 
166 See page 548. 
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wealth tax liability is always less than the income tax liability. For 
example, a married couple filing jointly and taking the standard de-
duction had an income tax liability in 1994 of $578, but would have 
zero wealth tax liability. The greatest wealth tax liability for a tax-
payer with $15,000 of earned income would be for a single individual 
with no children, who would owe $800. U nder the income tax, how-
ever, her liability was $1,320. Both the income tax data and the 
wealth tax data exclude the earned income credit, which generally has 
been excluded from our analysis. 
We believe that the wealth tax is greater than the income tax in the 
low income range because the wealth tax taxes two categories that the 
income tax may not tax: retired individuals with substantial wealth167 
and wealthy individuals whose income is low because of losses suf-
fered in the current year. We think it is appropriate to increase tax 
liability on such individuals. 
The other region where the wealth tax would have a significantly 
different distributional effect than the income tax is the region above 
$500,000 and particularly above $1 million of AGI (the "high income 
range"), where the burden of the wealth tax plummets. We find the 
behavior of the wealth tax in the high income region disturbing. We 
are uncertain as to the cause of the drop in the tax burden. One possi-
bility is that the data is flawed. While the SCF makes every effort to 
obtain a valid high wealth sample, there are inevitable weaknesses in 
their data.l68 For example, even if Bill Gates responded to their post-
card, his answers could not be released in the public data set without 
inevitable disclosure. It also may be the case that those with high AGI 
systematically under-report their wealth.169 
167 As a reminder of what we mean by substantial wealth, note that a single retired 
person with no wages and $200,000 of savings would be subject to a tax of $3,136, but 
would have a head of household credit of $1 ,500 and an individual credit of $400. Thus, the 
individual would pay a tax of only $1,236. A retired married couple with $200,000 of sav-
ings would pay no wealth tax because their credits would be $3,800. If the United States 
were to move from an income tax to a wealth tax, one major problem would be how to 
treat retired people, whose wealth already has been subject to an income tax. This , and a 
host of other transitional issues, are not considered in this Article. 
168 The SCF sends a postcard to a sample of high income individuals asking for their 
participation in the survey. 
169 Another problem with the SCF is that it explicitly excludes the very richest individu-
als. Arthur B. Kennickel, Using Income Data to Predict Wealth, (SCF Working Paper, Jan. 
1999), available at <http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/pubs/oss/oss2/papers/wealth.income.6.pdf>, 
at 1 ("(the SCF sample] specifically excludes very prominent individuals, including mem-
bers of the 'Forbes 400"'). For 1996, Forbes reports that the richest 400 people in the 
United States have wealth of over $400 billion. Ann Marsh, The Forbes Four Hundred, 
Forbes, Oct. 14, 1996, at 100. According to the SCF, in 1994, the richest 398 people in the 
United States had wealth of $99 billion. We tried increasing the wealth of the top 398 
persons in the SCF by a factor of four. The effect on the distribution was not large. 
2000) A COMPREHENSIVE WEALTH TAX 569 
We have examined some of the data on a case-by-case basis to see if 
we can understand the cause of the decline in the burden. In doing so, 
we found some anomalies that could provide a partial explanation of 
the results, but such inquiries have been only preliminary. 
An example of an anomalous data point is an individual in the SCF 
who reports $5 million in AGI. The SCF attributes about $500,000 of 
salary to this individual.170 Where does the other $4.5 million of in-
come come from? The individual owns a home worth $160,000, sub-
ject to a mortgage of about that amount. The individual has a small 
checking account and no other assets. Under the weighting system 
used by the SCF, this data point represents almost 10,000 households, 
making it a significant point among households in the high income 
range. Yet, his wealth tax is relatively small, only about 18% of his 
$500,000 salary, making it seem that the burden of the wealth tax is 
relatively light on those with high AGI. Dropping this one data point 
from the sample improves the results, but only slightly.171 We have 
identified some other data points that we view as anomalous, but we 
have not yet formalized the process of handling outliers. 
We continue to investigate reasons for the behavior of the wealth 
tax in this region.l72 Ultimately, if we conclude that the problem is in 
our design and not in our data, we will consider the possibility of a 
high-net-worth or high-wage surtax. Hopefully, such a tax could be 
aimed only at the highest wealth individuals without seriously dis-
turbing the administrative benefits of the tax. 
Figures 6-12 contain graphs showing the distribution of the wealth 
tax under different scenarios. Figure 6 shows the effect of taxing 
earned income only. As expected, the wealth tax becomes signifi-
cantly less progressive. It is noteworthy that the tax drops for individ-
uals with over $1 million of AGI, suggesting that part of the reason 
the wealth tax is regressive at the highest AGI levels is the drop in 
earned income in the high income range. 
170 The language in the text is chosen with care. Not all respondents answer all ques-
tions in the SCF. To make the SCF useful, and to allow researchers to make reasonable 
statistical determinations based on its data, some information is imputed to complete 
otherwise incomplete records. The records indicate when such imputations have been 
made. Thus, in respect of this record, the $5 million of AGI is not imputed, but the salary 
information is imputed. 
l71 On a number of occasions, we pointed out to the SCF staff data in the SCF that 
appears anomalous. They have been extremely responsive and where appropriate, have 
made changes to the data or the codebook. When we pointed out this particular anomaly, 
they told us that no change would be made. They did not (and, because of the need to 
keep the identity of the underlying respondents confidential, very possibly could not) ex-
plain to us their reasons. 
172 For example, we have considered the possibility of using more detailed tax return 
data to validate the distribution of AGI in the high income range. The use of the Forbes 
data discussed in note 169 is another example. 
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Figure 7 shows the effect of a tax on net worth only. The tax does 
an excellent job of tracking the income tax except in the low income 
range and the high income range. The high tax rates in the low in-
come range support our theory that there are individuals with low 
AGI and high wealth. As compared to the base case, the net-worth-
only-tax imposes higher burdens on high income individuals. 
Figure 8 shows the effect of including all housing. As expected, in-
cluding housing makes the wealth tax somewhat less progressive, pre-
sumably because housing wealth represents a greater proportion of 
wealth for low and middle income individuals. 
Figure 9 shows the effect of excluding housing while permitting 
mortgages to reduce net worth. Interestingly, the results are almost 
identical to those of the base case shown in Figure 5. This suggests 
that permitting a deduction for mortgages while excluding housing 
would have the detrimental effect of raising marginal rates, while hav-
ing no appreciable effect on distribution. 
Figures 10 and 11 show the effect of lowering and raising the credits 
respectively. When the credits are cut by one-half, the wealth tax be-
comes significantly less progressive, indicating that the credits are a 
substantial source of progressivity. When the credits are doubled, the 
wealth tax becomes substantially more progressive, while still showing 
increased average tax liability in the low income range and decreases 
in the high income range when compared to the income tax. 
Finally, Figure 12 compares the personal income tax to a wealth tax 
that replaces only the personal income tax. Again, the wealth tax 
does a good job of tracking the income tax, except in the low income 
and very high income ranges. 
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IX. CoNcLuSION 
Our results so far encourage our belief that it is worthwhile to in-
vestigate what a flat-rate wealth tax (including an earned income com-
ponent) might look like in the United States. Whether or not such a 
tax is ever enacted, a serious consideration of the tax provides insight 
into the current income tax as well as other potential tax systems. 
On an administrative level, we believe that a wealth tax can provide 
significant simplification. We recognize, however, that there are at 
least two serious administrative weaknesses to a wealth tax. First, and 
most obviously, there is the need to value assets and liabilities in order 
to determine net worth. Second, there is the need to distinguish be-
tween a return from capital (which would be tax-free) and a return 
from labor (which would not be). 
As a distributional matter, we are encouraged that , through most of 
the income range, a flat-rate wealth tax can be at least as progressive 
(measured against income) as is the current income tax. We would be 
disturbed by a tax that was significantly less progressive and suspect 
that there is little political support for a tax that is significantly more 
progressive. We are troubled, however, by the drop in progressivity in 
the high income range. We are hopeful that a more detailed examina-
tion of the underlying data will allow us to provide a fuller explana-
tion of our reported results. 
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APPENDIX 
ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTION OF THE SCF DATA AND 
CoMPARISONS WITH SOl DATA. 
579 
In this Appendix, we provide additional information on the SCF 
dataset and comparisons of the SCF dataset and data from SOL 
Figures 13 and 14 show, by AGI category, total net worth and total 
earned income subject to tax under the base case. Each column in the 
graphs is divided into primary economic units and non-PEU members. 
Figure 15 shows total tax by AGI figures for the personal income 
tax, the combined personal and corporate income taxes , and the 
wealth tax (under the base case). 
Figure 16 shows a comparison of the number of filing units by AGI 
categories under different approaches. 
The first bar in each set shows the number of filers for the current 
income tax based on SOl data. The second bar shows the number of 
primary economic units in the SCF. Where spouses (or partners) in a 
primary economic unit file separately, the SCF reports their separate 
AGis. The third bar uses this data to create separate filing units. Fi-
nally, the fourth bar adds in filing units composed [RS: oF?] on non-
PEU members.l73 
Figure 17 shows a comparison of the total AGI by adjusted gross 
income categories. As with Figure 16, the first bar is from SOl data. 
The second bar includes only primary economic units and treats each 
primary economic unit as a single filing unit. The third bar divides 
primary economic units into two filing units when the survey indicates 
that the spouses (partners) filed separately. Finally, the fourth bar 
adds in data from non-PEU members. 
173 None of the bars on the graph corresponds directly to the analysis in the body of the 
Article. In particular, the main analysis treats the primary economic unit as a single filer, 
but also treats all non-PEU members in a household as an additional filing unit. 
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